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Introduction
The story of this thesis started with my concern about the present state of the world. We are on
a path that is not sustainable, environmentally or socially, and it is my passion to help change
things for the better. I thus decided to combine that passion with my previous knowledge,
which is in finance. The three essays on sustainable finance included in this thesis seek to make
a contribution, albeit a small one, to the well-being of our world and to society as a whole.
The first chapter that I wrote is not the one that appears first here, but the second. In my
quest to find an interesting topic to write about in my thesis I came upon the paper in which
Hahn and Figge (2011) presented the Value Contribution of the Resource and the Sustainable
Value, measures that correct a company’s profit taking into account ESG variables. I found those
measures very interesting and this gave me the idea for my own first paper: creating measures
that helped investors make investment decisions considering ESG factors, i.e. considering issues
other than the financial profitability of their shares. And that idea led to the second chapter of
this thesis, which ended up being published in the first-quartile JCR journal Business Strategy
and the Environment on January 19, 2018.
Next came what constitutes the third chapter of this thesis. I was interested in learning
whether measures such as the ones I proposed in my first article were being used by rating
agencies when determining companies’ credit ratings. That is, I wanted to know whether the
environmental and social performance of companies is taken into consideration when determining
the credit ratings because it is not possible to determine from the documents issued by the
agencies whether they do so or not (to be honest, I also thought that if someone had to be the
first to use the measures I had proposed, it should be me). I conducted that analysis in the
article that now forms the third chapter of this thesis, which was published in the special issue
on Sustainable Finance of the second-quartile JCR journal Sustainability on November 19, 2018.
Finally, having used data on ESG information reported by companies in my first two studies,
I realised that reporting was uneven from one country and sector to another. I was also lucky
enough to have access to the large, widely used Datastream database, and more specifically to its
ESG part, ASSET4. I gathered as much data as possible from it and analysed the determinants
of ESG reporting, including company characteristics, as in most of the previous literature, as
well as country and sector variables. This made up the last chapter of this thesis to be written,
but the one that appears first in this document.
The order in which the chapters appear in this thesis follows the logical development of
improvements in this area within Sustainable Finance:
1
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1. First, ESG data are needed. Companies are one of the main actors in the economy and
can play a big role in the achievement (or non-achievement) of sustainability. Therefore,
we need companies to report ESG information. To learn how to foster the process of
improvement in ESG reporting, we need to analyse the factors that make wider reporting
possible and to determine who the best performers in ESG reporting are. Thus, Chapter
1 features a hybrid panel data analysis with robust standard errors clustered by company.
I find that the reporting patterns are different for environmental and social information
on the one hand and governance on the other. I confirm some of the findings of previous
literature, such as the positive effect of company size on ESG reporting, and add some new
insights such as those derived from the separation of within and between effects in hybrid
models. For instance, I conclude that becoming more profitable does not increase the
quantity of environmental and social information that a company reports, but that more
profitable companies do report more than less profitable ones. I also find that companies
from environmentally sensitive industries tend to report more environmental and social
information, but not more governance information. Moreover, South African companies
report the most non-financial information, while Peruvian and Argentinian companies
report the least. Companies from the Euro area report more environmental information
than others, but less governance information. The same goes for companies domiciled in
tax havens.
2. Second, once data are available they must be processed, because rough data are not very
useful as a basis for decision-making. Therefore, Chapter 2 proposes two measures: the Rel-
ative Sustainable Performance Measure (RSPM) and the Measure of Commitment-failure
(MC), which permit sustainable decision making taking not just financial but environmen-
tal and social variables into consideration for both investors and companies themselves.
This makes a triple bottom line (TBL) approach to investment decisions possible. I apply
my measures to the worldwide chemical sector and validate them there. I also propose a 2D
graphical sustainability analysis, which is simple and easy for investors to understand when
making investment decisions and can be used if they are concerned about environmental
and social matters. It also enables companies to analyse their sustainability performance
and adapt their business plans accordingly.
3. Finally, it is also important to know whether those measures are actually being used in
the real world. In Chapter 3, I look at one very important indicator used by investors
when they make investment decisions: the credit rating of the potential investment. I test
whether credit ratings take the above-mentioned measures into account. Following the
literature, I conduct a fixed-effects ordered probit analysis, using as controls the variables
usually found in the related literature on credit rating analysis. The dependent variables
are S&P ratings. I find that companies with higher sustainability performance levels tend
to have higher credit ratings, though performing less consistently over time seems to have
no effect. To check the robustness of my results, I also perform the analysis for different
sectors and sub-periods. In addition, I conduct the analysis using sustainability scores
provided by ASSET4 (Datastream) as an explanatory variable and using Fitch credit
ratings as the explained variable.
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This thesis therefore covers the process between ESG information disclosure, the use of
the data reported to create measures that enable the non-financial performance of different
companies to be compared and the use given to those measures to make sustainable investment
decisions.
The last section of the document sets out some general conclusions.
So now let the journey begin...
3
1
What are the determinants of ESG reporting?
1 Introduction
Companies have been disclosing financial information about themselves for many years, given
that such information has long been seen as the most important for taking investment decisions
and for monitoring companies’ performance. However, in the last few decades awareness of
sustainability has grown and stakeholders, in particular investors, have come to demand more
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) information from companies so as to be
able to make sustainable decisions that take into consideration the non-financial performance of
companies.
That shift in investor demands has also been reflected in the legislation of countries: ‘once
only a voluntary activity, there is a trend towards mandatory non-financial reporting. For
example, in South Africa, China, Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, and most recently the European
Union there are requirements in place for companies, be they large, publicly-listed or state-owned
companies, to disclose ESG practices’ (United Nations Global Compact, 2014).
However, although some ESG reporting regulations have existed for many years, more general
sustainability regulations have been introduced only recently. For example, it was not until 2013
that the European Union issued its “Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements
and related reports of certain types of undertaking”, which obliges large companies with more
than 500 employees to disclose information regarding, among others, environmental and social
matters as well as issues concerning human rights and anticorruption affecting their company.
This regulation did not become mandatory until fiscal year 2018.
Due to this trend, the amount of non-financial data available has increased in the last few
4
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decades (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017; Stolowy and Paugam, 2018). In fact, the number of com-
panies included in Datastream ASSET4, a database that includes data on ESG items reported
by companies and other key performance indicators calculated from them, increased six-fold
from 2002 to 2016, showing the growing interest in ESG information reporting. This increase
has lead to new reporting trends such as ‘integrated reporting’ (IR), the creation of single re-
ports that include both economic and ESG information about companies (Jensen and Berg,
2012; Abeysekera, 2013; Cheng et al., 2014; De Villiers et al., 2014). However, as the authors
noticed when analysing non-financial data for previous studies and mentioned by Peiró-Signes
et al. (2012), ESG data disclosure is uneven in different countries and sectors. This paper thus
sets out to find the determinants of non-financial reporting: is it law enforcement driven or are
there company, country or industry characteristics that make it more probable that a company
will disclose non-financial information?
Many authors, such as Freedman and Jaggi (2005), Brammer and Pavelin (2006), Clarkson
et al. (2008), Stanny and Ely (2008), Clarkson et al. (2011), D’Amico et al. (2016) and Stolowy
and Paugam (2018), have studied the determinants of ESG reporting, especially environmental
reporting. They analyse mainly the effect of the financial characteristics of companies on non-
financial reporting, and find some matching results (e.g. the positive effect of company size)
and others that are mixed (e.g. the effect of leverage). Apart from the financial determinants of
non-financial reporting, D’Amico et al. (2016) include a variable related to regulation in their
study and Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) study the effect of mandatory sustainability regulation
on sustainability reporting.
In this paper we add to the existing literature by performing an analysis of a broad interna-
tional sample of companies from different sectors dating from 2002-2017. In fact, authors such
as D’Amico et al. (2016) and Stolowy and Paugam (2018) mention in their papers the interest
of conducting more global analyses. Specifically, Stanny and Ely (2008) emphasise the need for
this, arguing that since environmental issues are global ‘it will be important to ensure appropri-
ate disclosure across firms globally’. To do that, it is necessary to understand the incentives that
lead companies to disclose environmental information. The international nature of our sample
enables us to include country-related variables, which enriches our analysis and differentiates
if from other research work. As far as we know, conducting our analysis with an international
sample over such a long period is also a contribution. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study that analyses the reporting patterns for environmental, social and governance
data separately and also combines the information on non-financial reporting using Principal
Component Analysis. Finally, we use a hybrid panel data analysis that separates the within
and between effects of variables that are time-variant, which has not been done previously in
reporting analysis.
Our main findings include different ESG reporting patterns for different types of information
(mainly environmental and social vs. governance) and determining the best and worst performers
in terms of non-financial reporting (by countries, sectors, etc.). Due to the methodology used, we
also find that, depending on the variable, some within and between estimators are statistically
different, which reveals different effects of those variables for a company over time and between
companies that differ in terms of that variable.
5
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section Two presents our hypotheses regarding
the determinants of ESG disclosure. Section Three contains the descriptive analysis of the
variables used in the model estimations to test those hypotheses. Section Four presents the
results of the model estimations and Section Five outlines the conclusions of the paper.
2 Hypotheses
This section presents the hypotheses tested in this paper, which are classified as Company,
Industry and Country Features. When two or more hypotheses with the same number and
different letters (e.g. 6a and 6b) are presented, they are considered as alternative hypotheses
and are thus not both tested simultaneously so as to avoid multicollinearity in the estimations.
2.1 Company Features
Company features, such as financial and economic situation, size, etc. can affect decisions on
whether or not to report certain non-financial information, as mentioned in the Introduction.
This subsection presents the different hypothesis tested regarding these features.
Size
Prior research has included the size of the company as one of the drivers of both general and
environmental disclosure, with a positive relationship being found in almost all cases between
company size and disclosure. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Helfaya and Moussa (2017) are
exceptions: the former finds that the size-environmental disclosure relationship is negative and
the latter that there is no such relationship.
This positive relationship hypothesis relies on the idea that bigger companies have higher
public visibility and, therefore, stakeholders demand more information from them (Eleftheri-
adis and Anagnostopoulou, 2015). Moreover, since bigger companies benefit more from greater
disclosure (Fŕıas-Aceituno et al., 2014), they can afford to dedicate more resources to the col-
lection and disclosure of non-financial information than smaller companies (Eleftheriadis and
Anagnostopoulou, 2015).
Since this has been widely proven, our hypothesis is the following:
H1: Size has a positive effect on non-financial information disclosure.
Profitability
Stakeholder theory states more profitable companies will report environmental and social infor-
mation and information on investment in social responsibility (Cho and Patten, 2007; D’Amico
et al., 2016) voluntarily more often than less profitable companies, because they are more likely
to invest in higher social value activities and want to spread that information. Some authors,
such as Cormier and Magnan (1999), Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou (2015) and Stolowy
and Paugam (2018), have confirmed this theory.
6
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At the same time, other authors defend just the opposite, i.e. that companies with worse
economic performance disclose more non-financial information in order to make themselves more
attractive (Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2013). Most authors, however, do not find any signif-
icant relationship between profitability (measured as return on assets -ROA-, return on equity
-ROE- or return on investment -ROI-) and non-financial information disclosure or IR adoption.
Taking all this into account, we choose to measure profitability as the ROA of companies
and state the following hypothesis:
H2: Profitability has a positive effect on non-financial information disclosure.
Financial Situation
Some authors have also considered leverage as a possible explanatory variable of non-financial
reporting. However, they have obtained mixed results.
Prencipe (2004), Clarkson et al. (2008) and D’Amico et al. (2016) are among those who find a
positive relationship. As Freedman and Jaggi (2005) and Gallego-Álvarez (2012) argue, greater
information disclosure is likely to lead to being chosen by more investors because they can more
easily ‘measure the risks associated with a firm’s operational activities’. Thus, companies that
are more in debt tend to report more non-financial information. In fact, some lenders might
require this type of information periodically (Lai et al., 2016).
Those reporting a negative relationship include Cormier and Magnan (1999, 2003), Brammer
and Pavelin (2006) and Ben-Amar and McIlkenny (2015). The reason could be the fact that more
indebted companies cannot afford ‘the costs of producing and publishing information regarding
their environmental practices’ (Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2013). Nevertheless, most authors
find no significant relationship between leverage (measured as either the debt/equity or the
debt/asset ratio) and disclosure.
We choose to measure leverage as the debt/total assets ratio and test the following hypoth-
esis:
H3: Leverage has a negative effect on non-financial information disclosure.
Capital Intensity
Capital intensity has been found to have a positive relationship with CSR/sustainability report-
ing by Clarkson et al. (2008), Clarkson et al. (2011) and Stolowy and Paugam (2018). The
rationale behind this relationship is that ‘firms with higher sustaining capital expenditures [...]
are expected to have newer equipment and a better environmental performance’ and, therefore,
might want to disclose information about it (Clarkson et al., 2008; Borghei et al., 2018).
We measure capital intensity as the ratio of ‘Property, Plant and Equipment’ (PPE) to total
assets, as Clarkson et al. (2011) do, and test the following hypothesis:
H4: Capital intensity has a positive effect on non-financial information disclosure.
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Growth opportunities
Some studies such as Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009a,b) and Prado-Lorenzo and Garćıa-Sánchez
(2010) have found that companies with greater growth opportunities, measured in terms of
market-to-book value (MTBV), tend to disclose more information voluntarily than companies
with lower growth opportunities. The reason seems to be that information is needed by investors
to establish trust in potential investments, so disclosure is a way of reducing information asym-
metry and, thus, the cost of external financing (Fŕıas-Aceituno et al., 2014). However, authors
such as Fŕıas-Aceituno et al. (2014), Ben-Amar and McIlkenny (2015) and Stolowy and Paugam
(2018) do not find this relationship significant.
Consequently, our hypothesis is the following:
H5: Growth opportunities have a positive effect on non-financial information disclosure.
2.2 Industry Features
Sector has traditionally been considered a relevant variable when measuring the amount of
information that companies report: it is argued that companies in the same sector tend to
behave in similar ways when disclosing information. Accordingly, not only the amount but also
the type of non-financial information reported is dependent on the sector in which companies
operate. Some authors, such as Oyelere et al. (2003), Gul and Leung (2004) and Bonsón and
Escobar (2004), have found the sector in which a company operates to be a variable that helps
explain the amount of information that companies disclose voluntarily. However, Fŕıas-Aceituno
et al. (2014) do not find any significant relationship between sector and integrated reporting, and
Al-Gamrh and Al-dhamari (2016) and Halkos and Skouloudis (2016) do not find any significant
relationship between CSR disclosure and the type of industry.
A special interpretation of the influence of the sector states that it is not the sector of industry
in general that explains the amount of non-financial information disclosed but the fact that some
industries are considered sensitive [especially environmentally sensitive, for example high carbon
impact industries (Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015)]. Indeed, many scholars have recently taken
this fact into account in their papers and have found mixed results. For example, Patten (2002),
Halkos and Skouloudis (2016) and Stolowy and Paugam (2018) find that a company in a sensitive
industry is significantly more likely to disclose sustainability information, but da Silva Monteiro
and Aibar-Guzmán (2010) do not. D’Amico et al. (2016) find that companies in sensitive
industries ‘limit themselves to reporting environmental information of a qualitative nature’.
Other authors find that companies in certain sectors tend to disclose more non-financial infor-
mation. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find that companies in sectors with higher environmental
impacts are more likely to disclose environmental information than those in lower environmen-
tal impact sectors. To name a few other examples, Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou (2015)
conclude that belonging to the ‘Oil and Gas’ sector has a significantly positive effect on the
amount of climate change information disclosed, while Lai et al. (2016) find that companies in
‘Basic Materials’, ‘Industrials’, and ‘Financials’ are more likely to produce an integrated report
than ‘Oil and Gas’ companies. Freedman and Jaggi (2005) find that the four sectors that they
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test (‘Auto’, ‘Oil’, ‘Energy’ and ‘Chemicals’) report significantly more than others and Cormier
and Magnan (1999) find that ‘Steel, metals and mines’ companies disclose less environmental
information than ‘Pulp and paper’ companies. Cowen et al. (1987) find that certain sectors are
more likely to report certain types of information.
We hypothesise that being part of an environmentally sensitive industry increases the amount
of non-financial information disclosed by companies. We follow the “sensitive industry” classi-
fication drawn up by Cho and Patten (2007) and followed by Stolowy and Paugam (2018).
All in all, we test these two alternative hypotheses:
H6a: Non-financial reporting varies from one sector to another.
H6b: Being part of a sensitive industry has a positive effect on non-financial information
disclosure.
2.3 Country Features
Location can influence the quantity and type of non-financial information reported by companies.
This subsection presents the different hypotheses tested regarding country features.
Country
Companies are influenced by the context in which they operate. Specifically, the quantity and
type of information that they disclose depends on the culture of the country in which they
are established. For example, South Africa is known as a pioneer in non-financial information
disclosure and thus has a core role in studies regarding non-financial disclosure such as Stolowy
and Paugam (2018).
Therefore, we test the following hypothesis:
H7a: Non-financial disclosure varies from one country to another.
Continent
In line with H7a, the continent where a company is located also influences the quantity and
type of information that it discloses. For example, as can be observed in the next section,
European companies report more non-financial information in relative terms than companies on
other continents.
H7b: Non-financial disclosure varies from one continent to another.
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Currency
Similarly, currency, which in cases such as the Euro Area extends across a group of countries,
can also define zones with higher or lower non-financial information disclosure.
Therefore, our hypothesis is:
H7c: Non-financial disclosure varies depending on the currency of reporting.
Legislation/regulation on non-financial information disclosure
Of course, if there is regulation enforcing non-financial information disclosure, be it a law enacted
by government, a requirement of a stock exchange or similar regulations, companies affected
will report such information. However, if there are no such regulations in force, companies can
choose whether or not to collect and disclose non-financial information. D’Amico et al. (2016)
include legislation in their study of environmental disclosure by Italian companies, and find
that the introduction of legislation had a positive effect only on quantitative disclosure (not on
qualitative disclosure). Along the same lines, Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) find a positive effect
of mandatory regulations on ESG reporting.
Here, we only test quantitative disclosure, so we hypothesise as follows:
H7d: The existence of regulations about mandatory non-financial disclosure has a positive
effect on non-financial information disclosure.
Tax Havens
Very low taxes for foreigners and financial secrecy have traditionally been associated with tax
havens. If financial secrecy is high and fiscal regulation is lax, then non-financial disclosure can
also be expected to be lower.
Therefore, we test the following hypothesis:
H7e: The fact that the country where a company is located is a tax haven has a negative
effect on non-financial information disclosure.
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Human Development Index (HDI)
The HDI has been used for many years to measure the development level of countries. We believe
that the development level of a country might be related to the priorities of its governments,
companies and citizens. Therefore, in a country with a higher HDI there might be higher
demands from citizens and investors for their companies to disclose non-financial information
and, as a result, disclosure by companies might be higher. Jensen and Berg (2012) include HDI
in their analysis and confirm the positive effect of higher levels on IR.
Therefore, we test the following hypothesis:
H7f: The Human Development Index for the country in which a company is located has a
positive effect on non-financial information disclosure.
3 Data sampling and descriptive statistics
This section presents the data used in this paper and their sources, along with a brief analysis
of the descriptive statistics for each variable included in the sample.
3.1 Sample selection
Most of the data used in this study were obtained from the ASSET4 database in Datastream.
At the time of our data collection in July 2018 yearly ESG information1 provided by companies
was available for 2002 to 2017 for many sectors2.
There were a total of 7,232 companies in the ASSET4 universe, of which 6,031 were active in
July 2018. To determine whether companies were part of the ASSET4 universe throughout the
period, we consider the Equal-Weighted Rating /ESG Score and the ESGScore: if Datastream
gives a company either of those scores in a year, we assume that the company is part of the
ASSET4 universe in that year.
In this paper we consider quantitative (not qualitative) ESG variables reported by companies
along with other variables that characterise companies themselves, including financial variables.
The reason for choosing only quantitative variables is that greater preparation efforts are required
to report them, which shows that the company is considering and doing the calculations to report
the data. For example, it is easier to report that the company is making an effort to reduce its
CO2 Emissions than to actually prepare and disclose actual figures.
We disregard all incomplete observations. We also disregard outlier observations that could
distort our results using the heuristics presented in Verzani (2014), based on the boxplot function
in Chambers et al. (1983):
LowerLimit = Q1− k ∗ (Q3−Q1) (1.1)
1https://bizlib247.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/asset4_esg_data_glossary_feb2015_v1-4_
external.xlsx
2In July 2018, some companies had not reported their 2017 data yet, but might have reported them later.
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and
UpperLimit = Q3− k ∗ (Q3−Q1) (1.2)
where Qs is the s-th quartile and k a scalar adjusted to eliminate observations causing
problems in the estimations and keep as many non-problematic observations as possible.
To complete the sample, we obtained the values of HDI for the countries represented in
the sample from the United Nations Development Program website3. We also created a binary
variable determining whether the countries to which companies belong are tax havens or not
based on the European Union (EU) grey list of tax havens4. We also created binary variables on
non-financial mandatory disclosure regulations based on the information found in the database
about sustainability reporting instruments referenced in Bartels et al. (2016)5. The regulations
are classified as environmental/social/governance/general. For the scope of regulation we con-
sider that those classified as, for example, ”Environmental & Social” should be included in both
the social and environmental categories. Moreover, we assume that the regulations came into
force in the year of effect included in the database, unless otherwise stated in the text part of
it. Companies from countries not in the above-mentioned database are also eliminated from
our sample (less than 1% of the initial sample). Finally, with the SIC codes of the companies,
we created a variable indicating whether each company operates in a sensitive industry or not,
as in Stolowy and Paugam (2018); SIC codes starting with 10, 13, 26, 28, 29, 33 and 49 are
considered sensitive, others are not.
We ended up with a sample of 6,578 companies from 55 different countries operating in all
10 TRBC (Thomson Reuters Business Classification6) sectors for 2002 to 2017. The number of
companies per year is presented in Table 1.1. In total there are 47,526 company-year datapoints.
Observe that the coverage of the ASSET4 database increases from 2002 to 2016. The reason
for the lower number of observations in 2017 is that at the time of our data retrieval many
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Table 1.1: Number of companies per year
This table shows the number of companies in the sample per year.



















The dependent variables of the models estimated in this paper are calculated from the quan-
titative ESG variables obtained from ASSET4. We consider 25 environmental, 30 social and
18 corporate governance variables (see Appendix A for a full list of the ESG variables selected,
along with their codes and a brief explanation). Our aim is to determine what factors affect a
company’s decision to report non-financial data and not to examine the values of data, so we
transform those ESG variables into binary variables, assigning a value of 1 when the company
reports the value of a certain variable in a certain year and 0 otherwise.
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Table 1.2: Binary ESG Variables
This table shows the means of the binary ESG variables for the full period (2002-2017) and for two subperiods
(2002-2007 and 2008-2017), the growth rate from one subperiod to the other and the overall mean for all of
them in the last row.
Variable Mean (2002-2017) Mean (2002-2007) Mean (2008-2017) Mean Growth
Panel A: Environmental variables
CO2EmT 0.38992 0.27250 0.46037 68.95%
CO2DirEm 0.28134 0.15358 0.35800 133.11%
CO2IndEm 0.25803 0.10909 0.34739 218.44%
FlaNG 0.00729 0.00616 0.00796 29.28%
OzDepSub 0.03486 0.02730 0.03939 44.32%
NOxEm 0.14152 0.12901 0.14902 15.51%
SOxEm 0.13392 0.11698 0.14409 23.18%
VOCEm 0.07476 0.06650 0.07972 19.88%
WasTot 0.25446 0.18339 0.29710 62.00%
NhazWas 0.12237 0.07164 0.15280 113.30%
WasRecT 0.19662 0.12476 0.23973 92.15%
HazWas 0.13412 0.09565 0.15720 64.34%
WatDis 0.07482 0.05188 0.08858 70.72%
WatPolEm 0.06320 0.04405 0.07470 69.57%
ISOEMSCP 0.11375 0.05814 0.14711 153.02%
EnvExp 0.16774 0.10902 0.20297 86.18%
EnvProv 0.08972 0.04083 0.11906 191.61%
CO2S3 0.13229 0.02050 0.19937 872.33%
CoffCre 0.02412 0.00274 0.03694 1246.67%
ENVRDExp 0.04883 0.04708 0.04987 5.92%
EnUTot 0.30960 0.18363 0.38519 109.76%
IndEnU 0.01168 0.01225 0.01134 -7.42%
WWTot 0.30248 0.23085 0.34545 49.65%
FWWTot 0.16238 0.06121 0.22309 264.49%
WatRec 0.05536 0.02169 0.07556 248.41%
Environmental Mean 0.14341 0.08962 0.17568 96.03%
Panel B: Social variables
AlcRev 0.01047 0.01100 0.01016 -7.60%
TobRev 0.00396 0.00486 0.00342 -29.64%
FDAWLTot 0.00595 0.00834 0.00452 -45.87%
ProdDel 0.00375 0.00542 0.00275 -49.25%
NappDrug 0.00141 0.00171 0.00123 -28.14%
DonTot 0.32814 0.23661 0.38305 61.89%
PolCon 0.11825 0.08565 0.13781 60.90%
WomEmp 0.32299 0.18698 0.40460 116.39%
NwomEmp 0.06190 0.01909 0.08758 358.66%
WomMan 0.20910 0.12004 0.26254 118.71%
HRCCEqIn 0.09133 0.07189 0.10300 43.28%
DisEmp 0.07757 0.01115 0.11742 952.70%
SalWag 0.21413 0.32263 0.14903 -53.81%
Nemp 0.31233 0.17673 0.39369 122.77%
TURep 0.24681 0.13574 0.31345 130.92%
TurnEmp 0.18027 0.08658 0.23649 173.15%
continued on next page
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Variable Mean (2002-2017) Mean (2002-2007) Mean (2008-2017) Mean Growth
AnLay 0.08986 0.07041 0.10153 44.20%
PTEmp 0.10583 0.06087 0.13280 118.16%
EmpHSTH 0.02851 0.01546 0.03635 135.16%
TotInjR 0.16937 0.08362 0.22082 164.08%
AcciT 0.15048 0.06480 0.20189 211.53%
OcDisR 0.04364 0.01491 0.06088 308.23%
EmpFat 0.16575 0.09143 0.21034 130.05%
ConFat 0.06476 0.03899 0.08022 105.75%
LTIR 0.13567 0.07419 0.17256 132.59%
LostWD 0.08563 0.03347 0.11693 249.37%
AvTrainH 0.13310 0.06133 0.17617 187.26%
TrainCT 0.35294 0.23762 0.42214 77.66%
EmpSatP 0.04495 0.00460 0.06916 1403.95%
CSP 0.05388 0.00685 0.08209 1098.00%
Social Mean 0.12709 0.07810 0.15649 100.37%
Panel C: Corporate Governance variables
AudCInd 0.82674 0.67774 0.91615 35.18%
AudCNEM 0.85255 0.73315 0.92419 26.06%
CompCInd 0.74346 0.61614 0.81984 33.06%
CompCNEM 0.76031 0.65650 0.82260 25.30%
NomCInd 0.66389 0.50869 0.75701 48.81%
NomCNEM 0.66133 0.52111 0.74547 43.05%
BoMeeNum 0.82179 0.77452 0.85015 9.77%
BoMeeAAv 0.62327 0.40617 0.75353 85.52%
CoMeeAAv 0.54691 0.31230 0.68767 120.20%
BoSize 0.99311 0.98619 0.99726 1.12%
BoMemReY 0.86337 0.80265 0.89980 12.10%
SELTCI 0.56470 0.30825 0.71856 133.11%
BoMeLTCI 0.31372 0.05918 0.46644 688.21%
NEBoMeTC 0.35017 0.29237 0.38485 31.63%
SETC 0.73625 0.64177 0.79294 23.56%
ESGRepSc 0.17322 0.00032 0.27695 85200.40%
VotCapP 0.74454 0.49034 0.89706 82.95%
AdvNotP 0.24010 0.00000 0.38415 100.00%
Governance Mean 0.63775 0.48819 0.72748 49.02%
Overall Mean 0.25859 0.18316 0.30385 65.89%
Table 1.2 shows the descriptives for these variables. It shows that average reporting is much
higher for governance than for environmental and social variables. For example, AudCInd is
reported in about 83% of the 47,526 company-year datapoints, while CO2EmT is only reported
in about 39% of them. The table also reveals that the growth rate of the means from one period
to the other is notable for most of the variables, with an overall average of 65.89%. However,
the reporting of some variables decreases.
Instead of analysing each of the 73 binary ESG variables separately, we reduced the dimen-
sions of the analysis by creating more agglutinative measures from them. In total we have five
different combinations for the dependent variables in the estimations: three count variables and
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two principal components. An explanation of how they are calculated follows.
First, we calculate the number of environmental, social and/or governance variables reported
by a company for a certain year. These count variables are calculated for each company and
year. Their descriptive statistics year by year are shown in Panels A (environmental count
variable -ENV -), B (social count variable -SOC -) and C (corporate governance count variable
-GOV -) of Table 1.3. For example, the cross-sectional average reporting of environmental data
in 2002 is 1.38 variables/items out of a maximum of 25.
The means and their trends are consistent with Table 1.2. It is, however, noteworthy that
the positive trend seems to stop in 2015 for environmental and social reporting. We can find
no explanation for this other than the fact that companies added to the sample in those years
report less than those already in it. We can confirm in our sample that the environmental and
social reporting averages are appreciably lower for companies incorporated into it from 2015
onwards.
It is interesting that the minimum is always 0 but the maximum never reaches the highest
value possible for the environmental and the social combinations (25 and 30, respectively). This
shows that there are companies that report no environmental and/or social data, but none that
reports all data. However, for the governance combination the values are higher, even for the
minimum in some years, and the maximum is at or very close to the highest value possible (18).
This gives the distributions of the environmental and social combinations a positive skewness,
while the governance combination is negatively skewed. The standard deviation of the variables
increases over time, showing that there is greater heterogeneity in the disclosure of non-financial
information in the most recent years.
In addition, to create the last two dependent variables we use Principal Component (PC)
analysis on all the information for the 73 binary ESG variables. Two components are selected,
following the scree plot analysis. Those components are Varimax rotated and labelled as the
environmental and social PC (PCENVSOC) and the governance PC (PCGOV). Between them
they explain 29.56% of the total variance7. The scores for these rotated components (henceforth
called PC combinations) for each company and year are obtained.
The descriptive statistics for those two PC combinations can be found in Panels D and E of
Table 1.38. A similar growth pattern can be observed, ending in the last years of the sample for
PCENVSOC, but not for PCGOV. For the environmental and social PC combination the mean
is higher than the median, showing that there are more low values than high values but that
the high values are higher in absolute terms and making the distribution positively skewed. The
opposite is true for the governance PC combination, leading to the distribution being negatively
skewed.
7This might suggest that a lot of information is lost when only two components are chosen, but if it is taken
into account that the number of original variables is 73, it can be seen that between them the two components
selected explain about ten times what two original variables would explain. Moreover, as can be seen in Section
Four, the results of the estimations for the principal components do not differ substantially from the results for
the count variables.
8The means of the principal components are not 0 and their standard deviations are not 1, because they
are obtained using the whole sample (including all years and also some company-year observations subsequently
eliminated from the sample due to missing values or outliers in the financial variables) and in Panels D and E the
descriptive statistics appear by year.
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Table 1.3: Dependent variables: Combinations
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the combinations, calculated as the number of environmental,
social or governance variables reported by each company for a certain year (Panels A, B and C) or as
Varimax-rotated principal components (Panels D and E).






Panel A: Environmental Combination (ENV )
2002 1.37852 0 0 14 2.70153 1.96 2.20 7.32
2003 1.73658 0 0 14 3.12678 1.80 1.91 5.74
2004 1.73095 0 0 17 3.11801 1.80 1.96 6.20
2005 2.24961 0 0 18 3.55063 1.58 1.65 4.97
2006 2.75936 0 0 18 3.92853 1.42 1.37 3.94
2007 3.58754 1 0 21 4.60095 1.28 1.11 3.13
2008 3.72459 1 0 21 4.83685 1.30 1.11 3.06
2009 4.18718 2 0 21 5.11713 1.22 1.03 2.92
2010 4.36410 2 0 21 5.27735 1.21 1.03 2.92
2011 4.67556 3 0 22 5.44396 1.16 0.95 2.74
2012 5.00026 3 0 22 5.54741 1.11 0.85 2.56
2013 5.00682 3 0 22 5.55604 1.11 0.82 2.48
2014 5.02357 3 0 22 5.54203 1.10 0.81 2.46
2015 4.43024 2 0 22 5.36237 1.21 0.98 2.79
2016 3.88977 1 0 22 5.19020 1.33 1.15 3.16
2017 3.61784 0 0 22 5.09787 1.41 1.28 3.54
Panel B: Social Combination (SOC )
2002 1.90026 1 0 11 1.78850 0.94 1.43 5.69
2003 2.15855 2 0 11 1.94514 0.90 1.19 4.47
2004 1.91518 1 0 13 2.04575 1.07 1.54 5.65
2005 2.18024 1 0 14 2.39316 1.10 1.63 5.97
2006 2.53976 2 0 15 2.71169 1.07 1.40 4.61
2007 3.36380 2 0 16 3.27097 0.97 1.20 3.78
2008 3.67564 2 0 18 3.75644 1.02 1.25 3.76
2009 3.92622 2 0 18 3.89568 0.99 1.14 3.44
2010 4.27368 3 0 19 4.27871 1.00 1.08 3.21
2011 4.69911 3 0 20 4.57082 0.97 0.93 2.82
2012 5.23128 4 0 20 4.79657 0.92 0.82 2.60
2013 5.58308 4 0 21 4.87569 0.87 0.70 2.42
2014 5.51387 4 0 19 4.82629 0.88 0.66 2.37
2015 4.99020 3 0 21 4.74508 0.95 0.82 2.60
2016 4.58849 3 0 20 4.66578 1.02 0.94 2.79
2017 4.46454 3 0 20 4.45071 1.00 1.03 3.08
Panel C: Governance Combination (GOV )
2002 7.67647 8 0 16 3.49852 0.46 -0.31 2.18
2003 8.60674 10 0 15 3.53043 0.41 -0.53 2.26
2004 8.23260 9 0 16 3.99796 0.49 -0.44 1.90
2005 8.59643 10 0 16 4.31636 0.50 -0.56 1.90
2006 9.08055 11 0 16 4.43597 0.49 -0.59 1.96
2007 10.53161 13 0 16 4.55647 0.43 -0.96 2.51
2008 11.24963 13 0 16 4.30341 0.38 -1.15 2.94
2009 11.98905 14 0 17 3.93041 0.33 -1.35 3.62
continued on next page
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2010 12.16410 14 0 17 4.04077 0.33 -1.23 3.31
2011 12.67870 14 1 17 4.07639 0.32 -1.28 3.50
2012 13.27319 15 1 18 3.95149 0.30 -1.45 4.01
2013 13.47803 15 1 18 3.89072 0.29 -1.47 4.11
2014 13.70268 16 0 18 4.38880 0.32 -1.27 3.43
2015 13.98540 16 1 18 4.27914 0.31 -1.38 3.73
2016 13.95165 16 0 18 4.50155 0.32 -1.44 3.86
2017 14.47385 16 0 18 4.08000 0.28 -1.76 5.00
Panel D: Environmental and Social Principal Component Combination (PCENVSOC )
2002 -0.49966 -0.68 -0.90 1.78224 0.43968 0.88 2.03 7.16
2003 -0.43983 -0.65 -0.90 1.58937 0.51364 1.17 1.81 5.81
2004 -0.45949 -0.68 -0.90 1.85020 0.51400 1.12 1.86 6.17
2005 -0.37665 -0.66 -0.93 2.29115 0.59446 1.58 1.62 5.28
2006 -0.28475 -0.61 -0.91 2.40017 0.67245 2.36 1.40 4.38
2007 -0.12864 -0.50 -0.91 3.12812 0.80031 6.22 1.12 3.40
2008 -0.09565 -0.53 -0.91 2.98581 0.87848 9.18 1.11 3.21
2009 -0.02952 -0.45 -0.90 3.33217 0.93288 31.60 1.05 3.06
2010 0.05618 -0.40 -0.91 3.38769 1.01114 18.00 0.99 2.89
2011 0.14336 -0.30 -0.91 3.65515 1.06390 7.42 0.91 2.70
2012 0.23603 -0.16 -0.91 3.59666 1.09614 4.64 0.79 2.48
2013 0.27734 -0.08 -0.91 3.74493 1.10913 4.00 0.72 2.37
2014 0.29146 -0.04 -0.91 3.68954 1.12085 3.85 0.71 2.35
2015 0.16476 -0.29 -0.91 3.77155 1.09795 6.66 0.85 2.56
2016 0.05378 -0.55 -0.91 3.83310 1.07846 20.05 0.99 2.80
2017 0.00161 -0.58 -0.90 3.69169 1.04319 647.01 1.10 3.07
Panel E: Governance Principal Component Combination (PCGOV )
2002 -0.89111 -0.75 -3.11 0.92070 0.81299 0.91 -0.38 2.18
2003 -0.69223 -0.46 -2.76 0.74991 0.82794 1.20 -0.60 2.24
2004 -0.79370 -0.47 -2.90 0.74907 0.94257 1.19 -0.52 1.92
2005 -0.71884 -0.30 -3.12 0.90629 1.01644 1.41 -0.63 1.96
2006 -0.63168 -0.21 -3.09 0.93976 1.04129 1.65 -0.66 2.00
2007 -0.31229 0.18 -3.14 0.96465 1.08285 3.47 -1.03 2.61
2008 -0.15023 0.33 -3.09 1.15235 1.02590 6.83 -1.22 3.09
2009 0.03673 0.43 -3.15 1.23114 0.93455 25.45 -1.45 3.89
2010 0.03798 0.45 -2.77 1.29172 0.91716 24.15 -1.27 3.35
2011 0.11607 0.51 -2.59 1.28161 0.91926 7.92 -1.31 3.50
2012 0.21478 0.60 -2.71 1.37281 0.89067 4.15 -1.44 3.92
2013 0.24315 0.63 -2.58 1.34373 0.87260 3.59 -1.44 3.94
2014 0.19631 0.62 -2.83 1.33430 0.94858 4.83 -1.32 3.53
2015 0.24639 0.67 -2.98 1.31528 0.91649 3.72 -1.44 3.91
2016 0.23625 0.67 -2.98 1.37840 0.95924 4.06 -1.49 4.00
2017 0.33705 0.74 -2.98 1.28909 0.91761 2.72 -1.82 5.17
Table 1.4 shows the correlations between the different dependent variables. ENV and SOC
are highly correlated and well represented in PCENVSOC (high correlation of ENV and SOC
with the PCENVSOC ), but they are not related to GOV. Also, GOV is highly correlated with
PCGOV but not with ENV, SOC or PCENVSOC. Both principal components are very lightly
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correlated.
Table 1.4: Correlations of Dependent Variables
This table shows the correlations between the dependent variables. *** and * denote that the coefficients are
significantly different from zero at 0.1% and 5%, respectively.
ENV SOC GOV PCENVSOC PCGOV
ENV 1
SOC 0.7383∗∗∗ 1
GOV 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.2262∗∗∗ 1
PCENVSOC 0.9597∗∗∗ 0.8763∗∗∗ 0.0696∗∗∗ 1
PCGOV -0.0633∗∗∗ 0.2005∗∗∗ 0.9759∗∗∗ -0.0109∗ 1
All in all, there are five dependent variables of two different types to be estimated separately:
1. Three reported data count variables (between 0 and the highest value possible, which is
different for each of them): ENV, SOC and GOV
2. Two PC combinations: PCENVSOC and PCGOV
3.3 Independent variables
The regressors considered are those mentioned in Section 2. For each company and year the
following are obtained:
1. Financial variables:
(a) Size -size-, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US$9.
(b) Profitability -profitability-, measured as the ROA (return on assets).
(c) Leverage -leverageta-, measured as the ratio between total debt and total assets.
(d) Capital intensity -ppenetta-, measured as the ratio between net PPE and total assets.
(e) Growth opportunities -mtbv -, measured as the market-to-book value.
2. Variables related to the sector of the company (according to TRBC):
(a) Sector -sector -: 10 different economic sectors (see Appendix B for the list of sectors).
(b) Sensitive Industry -sensind -: a dummy variable valued at 1 if the company belongs
to an industry considered as sensitive (SIC Code that starts with 10, 13, 26, 28, 29,
33 and 49) and 0 otherwise.
3. Variables related to the country of the company:
(a) Country -country-: the country where the company is domiciled (see list of countries
in Appendix C).
(b) Continent -continent-: six continents, considering North and South America sepa-
rately.
9All total assets figures were converted to US$ when they were collected.
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(c) Currency -currency- (see Appendix D for the list of currencies).
(d) Existence of mandatory regulations requiring non-financial disclosure -regulation-: a
dummy variable valued at 1 if the country has such regulations in a specific year
and 0 otherwise. A distinction is drawn between environmental, social, governance
and general sustainability regulations, according to the sustainability pillar covered
(manenv, mansoc, mangov or mangen).
(e) Tax Haven -taxhaven-: a dummy variable valued at 1 if the country is considered a
tax haven10 and 0 otherwise (see Appendix E for more details).
(f) Human Development Index -hdi - of the country to which the company belongs.
Table 1.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the financial variables and the HDI, the indepen-
dent variables which are quantitative and continuous. Most of them do not vary much over the
period analysed. It also emerges that the companies in the sample have total assets of between
1.4 and 3,998,567.82 millions of US$ (smallest and biggest companies in the sample over the
whole period), with the average for the whole period being approximately 5,900.64 millions of
US$. The values of the rest of the financial variables are reasonable and cover a wide range of
companies. The average profitability is about 7%, with 25% being the average leverage, 30%
the average capital intensity and 2.69 the average market-to-book value (values above 1 mean
that the company has growth opportunities). The average HDI of the countries to which the
companies of the sample belong is quite high.
Table 1.5: Independent Variables: Quantitative and Continuous
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the quantitative variables used in this paper as independent
variables: size, profitability, leverageta, ppenetta, mtbv and hdi.






Panel A: Size (size)
2002 16.00 15.85 11.93 20.56 1.65 0.10 0.47 2.95
2003 16.14 15.98 12.47 20.96 1.67 0.10 0.55 3.06
2004 15.70 15.50 9.04 21.14 1.66 0.11 0.47 3.69
2005 15.73 15.51 10.53 21.18 1.62 0.10 0.56 3.58
2006 15.89 15.65 10.61 21.40 1.59 0.10 0.66 3.68
2007 15.97 15.75 11.59 21.80 1.58 0.10 0.69 3.71
2008 15.84 15.66 9.99 21.84 1.59 0.10 0.57 3.75
2009 15.71 15.54 10.06 21.80 1.64 0.10 0.49 3.70
2010 15.62 15.48 10.11 21.70 1.68 0.11 0.39 3.72
2011 15.65 15.53 9.63 21.75 1.68 0.11 0.39 3.68
2012 15.65 15.55 9.64 21.76 1.71 0.11 0.33 3.66
2013 15.62 15.53 8.80 21.86 1.74 0.11 0.23 3.69
2014 15.58 15.51 8.30 21.92 1.77 0.11 0.18 3.68
2015 15.40 15.32 7.25 21.95 1.76 0.11 0.25 3.70
2016 15.18 15.12 7.99 21.97 1.82 0.12 0.24 3.56
2017 15.19 15.11 8.22 22.11 1.93 0.13 0.30 3.75
continued on next page
10According to the European Union (EU) grey list of tax havens.
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Panel B: Profitability (profitability)
2002 0.06 0.06 -2.02 0.63 0.16 2.72 -7.05 86.22
2003 0.07 0.07 -0.87 0.45 0.09 1.31 -2.05 21.23
2004 0.09 0.07 -0.49 0.70 0.08 0.94 0.64 9.77
2005 0.09 0.08 -0.39 0.72 0.08 0.88 0.97 9.38
2006 0.10 0.08 -2.12 0.76 0.10 1.03 -4.82 125.53
2007 0.10 0.09 -0.98 0.68 0.10 1.00 -0.69 20.92
2008 0.08 0.07 -1.76 5.07 0.16 2.13 9.95 362.89
2009 0.06 0.05 -2.17 0.88 0.12 2.10 -2.68 54.97
2010 0.08 0.07 -0.73 1.19 0.10 1.25 0.78 18.24
2011 0.08 0.07 -1.08 1.40 0.11 1.34 0.30 24.26
2012 0.07 0.06 -1.27 5.47 0.14 1.97 13.51 559.34
2013 0.06 0.06 -2.46 1.14 0.13 2.08 -5.30 83.87
2014 0.06 0.06 -4.71 2.83 0.15 2.33 -7.30 328.29
2015 0.05 0.06 -2.40 1.05 0.15 3.08 -4.51 52.61
2016 0.05 0.06 -2.74 2.66 0.17 3.36 -3.99 82.02
2017 0.06 0.06 -2.51 1.43 0.16 2.78 -5.66 82.34
Panel C: Leverage (leverageta)
2002 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.90 0.16 0.61 0.44 3.19
2003 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.90 0.16 0.61 0.45 3.22
2004 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.97 0.17 0.68 0.61 3.31
2005 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.93 0.17 0.72 0.66 3.16
2006 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.95 0.17 0.72 0.68 3.20
2007 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.95 0.17 0.72 0.68 3.22
2008 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.95 0.18 0.71 0.62 3.10
2009 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.95 0.18 0.73 0.61 2.95
2010 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.97 0.18 0.75 0.68 3.18
2011 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.18 0.74 0.67 3.21
2012 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.95 0.18 0.74 0.67 3.19
2013 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.98 0.18 0.72 0.65 3.23
2014 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.99 0.18 0.70 0.62 3.18
2015 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.96 0.19 0.72 0.60 3.05
2016 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.99 0.19 0.75 0.65 3.08
2017 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.19 0.79 0.81 3.45
Panel D: Capital intensity (ppenetta)
2002 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.99 0.25 0.83 0.84 2.85
2003 0.29 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.25 0.86 0.87 2.87
2004 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.99 0.26 0.84 0.78 2.64
2005 0.30 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.85 0.83 2.78
2006 0.29 0.23 0.00 0.99 0.25 0.86 0.87 2.84
2007 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.99 0.26 0.87 0.84 2.75
2008 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.99 0.27 0.84 0.69 2.39
2009 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.99 0.27 0.84 0.65 2.34
2010 0.31 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.85 0.67 2.37
2011 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.99 0.26 0.86 0.70 2.41
2012 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.99 0.27 0.86 0.68 2.35
2013 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.99 0.27 0.87 0.72 2.39
continued on next page
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2014 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.99 0.28 0.88 0.72 2.39
2015 0.31 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.28 0.92 0.77 2.40
2016 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.99 0.28 0.96 0.85 2.53
2017 0.27 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.28 1.03 1.05 2.98
Panel E: Growth opportunities (mtbv)
2002 2.59 1.92 -6.900 22.08 2.51 0.97 3.32 21.27
2003 2.98 2.31 -20.37 26.86 2.73 0.92 1.03 23.92
2004 2.97 2.22 -16.35 30.15 2.93 0.99 3.16 25.53
2005 3.12 2.43 -26.50 31.31 3.12 1.00 1.69 27.24
2006 3.27 2.55 -29.60 34.64 3.34 1.02 1.40 30.01
2007 3.19 2.33 -26.81 36.05 3.65 1.15 2.07 27.31
2008 1.82 1.32 -18.51 20.69 2.27 1.25 1.84 25.74
2009 2.43 1.79 -20.53 27.40 2.73 1.13 2.48 25.25
2010 2.69 1.93 -27.99 31.64 3.07 1.14 2.96 29.79
2011 2.21 1.53 -20.03 27.59 2.72 1.23 2.61 27.35
2012 2.35 1.63 -26.00 30.90 2.93 1.25 2.43 28.99
2013 2.71 1.81 -26.71 36.02 3.34 1.23 3.12 26.44
2014 2.70 1.80 -32.20 35.77 3.56 1.32 2.89 29.21
2015 2.85 1.82 -29.71 37.05 3.84 1.35 2.85 24.29
2016 2.81 1.93 -31.49 37.69 3.99 1.42 1.35 26.07
2017 3.08 2.04 -34.63 39.75 4.45 1.44 1.58 23.67
Panel F: Human Development Index (hdi)
2002 0.88 0.89 0.61 0.92 0.02 0.03 -3.92 32.99
2003 0.88 0.89 0.62 0.92 0.02 0.03 -3.86 32.17
2004 0.88 0.89 0.63 0.93 0.02 0.03 -3.28 28.47
2005 0.89 0.89 0.65 0.93 0.02 0.02 -3.06 28.16
2006 0.89 0.89 0.66 0.93 0.02 0.02 -3.28 32.09
2007 0.89 0.90 0.56 0.94 0.03 0.04 -5.45 42.84
2008 0.88 0.90 0.56 0.94 0.06 0.06 -3.55 16.27
2009 0.88 0.90 0.49 0.94 0.06 0.07 -2.98 11.87
2010 0.87 0.90 0.50 0.94 0.08 0.09 -2.05 6.17
2011 0.87 0.91 0.51 0.94 0.08 0.10 -1.93 5.55
2012 0.87 0.90 0.51 0.94 0.09 0.10 -1.77 4.82
2013 0.87 0.91 0.52 0.95 0.08 0.10 -1.75 4.75
2014 0.87 0.91 0.53 0.95 0.08 0.09 -1.74 4.75
2015 0.88 0.92 0.53 0.95 0.08 0.09 -1.96 5.62
2016 0.89 0.92 0.54 0.95 0.07 0.08 -2.12 6.44
2017 0.90 0.93 0.54 0.96 0.07 0.07 -2.97 10.89
Table 1.6 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables described above. None of
them is high enough to raise suspicions of multicollinearity problems in the estimations.
The descriptives of most of the binary and the qualitative independent variables are shown
in Table 1.7. Panel A shows the distribution of the sample and of the reported data in terms of
the sector. In this case the effect is not as big as in the variables described below, but it leads
to the suspicion that belonging to the Financial sector is not conducive to ESG reporting and
that belonging to more pollutant sectors (Industrials, Energy, Basic Materials, Utilities, etc.)
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Table 1.6: Correlations of Independent Variables: Quantitative and Continuous
This table shows the correlations between the quantitative variables used in this paper as independent variables:
size, profitability, leverageta, ppenetta, mtbv and hdi. *** denotes that the coefficients are significantly different
from zero at 0.1%.
size profitability leverageta ppenetta mtbv hdi
size 1
profitability -0.0237∗∗∗ 1
leverageta 0.1496∗∗∗ -0.0821∗∗∗ 1
ppenetta -0.1169∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗ 0.2994∗∗∗ 1
mtbv -0.1773∗∗∗ 0.2207∗∗∗ -0.0501∗∗∗ -0.0961∗∗∗ 1
hdi -0.0613∗∗∗ -0.0785∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0072 -0.0027 1
may be positive for reporting (H6a). Panel B confirms that companies from sensitive industries
tend to report more than companies from non-sensitive industries. This variable can thus be
expected to have a significant effect on reporting (H6b).
Regarding the country variable, Panel C only shows the values for the most and least rep-
resented countries in the sample. The most represented country is the USA, to which about
40.12% of the companies in the sample belong. However, the data reported as a percentage of
the total data reported by all companies is much lower at 29.86%. To a lesser extent, the same
goes for Australia. In the cases of Japan and especially the United Kingdom the situation is just
the contrary. All this shows that country of origin can be a driver of the decision to report non-
financial data (H7a). From Panel D it is clear that companies from North America report less
than companies from other continents (35.89% reporting but 46.47% of the sample) and the op-
posite is true for companies from Europe. Therefore, significant differences between continents
can be expected in non-financial reporting (H7b). Regarding currencies, Panel E shows that
for companies which have the Euro as their main currency the reporting percentage is higher
(14.74% reporting compared to 7.66% of the sample). This is probably due to the efforts of the
European Union to increase non-financial reporting. Moreover, once again companies reporting
in US Dollars are shown to report less non-financial data than others. This variable can thus
also be expected to be significant in the regressions performed (H7c).
Panel F shows that the percentage of reporting is very similar to the proportion of the
sample for which countries account when they are classed as tax havens and non-tax havens.
This variable is thus unlikely to be significant in the regressions performed (unlike H7e).
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Table 1.7: Independent Variables: Qualitative









Panel A: Economic Sector (sector)
Financials 1,424 21.65% 18.52%
Industrials 1,020 15.51% 16.30%
Cyclical Consumer Goods &
Services
927 14.09% 14.08%
Basic Materials 676 10.28% 12.91%
Technology 630 9.58% 7.88%
Healthcare 531 8.07% 6.17%




Utilities 267 4.06% 5.51%
Telecommunications Services 173 2.63% 2.96%
Panel B: Sensitive Industry (sensind)
Yes 1,486 22.59% 27.35%
No 5,092 77.41% 72.65%
Panel C: Country (country)
USA 2,639 40.12% 29.86%
Australia 505 7.68% 6.77%
Japan 454 6.90% 7.05%
United Kingdom 433 6.58% 10.73%
...
Hungary 4 0.06% 0.12%
Morocco 3 0.05% 0.03%
Czech Republic 3 0.05% 0.05%
Others (5 countries) 5 0.08% 0.07%
Panel D: Continent (continent)
North America 3,057 46.47% 35.89%
Asia 1,459 22.18% 21.16%
Europe 1,187 18.04% 31.38%
Oceania 505 7.68% 6.77%
South America 212 3.22% 2.12%
Africa 158 2.40% 2.68%
Panel E: Currency (currency)
US$ 2,670 40.59% 30.14%
AU$ 505 7.68% 6.77%
e 504 7.66% 14.74%
...
CK 2 0.03% 0.04%
NG 1 0.02% 0.02%
KT 1 0.02% 0.02%
continued on next page
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Panel F: Tax Haven (taxhaven)
Yes 703 10.69% 10.15%
No 5,875 89.31% 89.85%
To measure the level of the relationship between the qualitative variables considered, we
calculate the Cramér’s V (Cramér, 1946) between them. Table 1.8 shows that all variables
related to the country of companies are closely related, so they are not included in the estimations
simultaneously. The same goes for the two variables related to sector. However, there is not a
strong relationship between the variables related to country and those related to sector, so one
of each type of variables is included in the estimations.
Table 1.8: Cramér’s V of Independent Variables: Qualitative
This table shows the values for Cramér’s V between most of the qualitative variables used in this paper as
independent variables. *** denotes that the Chi-square test indicates that the relationship between the variables
is significant at 0.1%.
continent country currency taxhaven sector sensind
continent 1
country 1∗∗∗ 1
currency 0.9965∗∗∗ 0.9839∗∗∗ 1
taxhaven 0.4485∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.9745∗∗∗ 1
sector 0.1167∗∗∗ 0.1870∗∗∗ 0.1746∗∗∗ 0.0881∗∗∗ 1
sensind 0.0918∗∗∗ 0.2137∗∗∗ 0.2098∗∗∗ -0.0461∗∗∗ 0.7955∗∗∗ 1
Table 1.9 shows descriptive statistics of the variables on mandatory sustainability disclosure
regulations, and reveals that in most cases the percentage of companies in a country with
a certain type of regulation is higher than the percentage of reporting accounted for by those
companies. This might be because companies in some countries report non-financial information
even though there may be no regulations of a certain type in those countries. It is also noteworthy
that regulations have increased over time, with the percentages of companies in countries with
regulations of most types being very high in the latest years of the sample.
Table 1.10 shows the correlation coefficients for the sustainability disclosure regulation vari-
ables. Most regulations are not highly correlated. However, the estimations do not include
all regulations related to the variable to be explained if multicollinearity problems arise. For
instance, in the model with PCENVSOC only the general sustainability reporting regulation
is reported, because including manenv and mansoc simultaneously in the models causes multi-
collinearity.
Finally, we measure the relationship between country and regulation variables and the cor-
relation between the latter and HDI. The relationship between regulation variables and country
is close (see Table 1.11), so we do not include them simultaneously in the estimations. From
the correlation coefficients between the regulation variables and HDI in Table 1.11, it can be
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Table 1.9: Independent Variables: Sustainability Disclosure Regulations
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the binary variables on mandatory sustainability disclosure
regulations.
Year
Environmental and mandatory Social and mandatory Governance and mandatory General and mandatory



















































2002 65.60% 53.62% 53.96% 42.73% 47.44% 59.02% 4.22% 3.39%
2003 65.54% 51.91% 54.31% 42.97% 47.19% 58.43% 7.12% 7.98%
2004 65.81% 63.94% 43.21% 38.27% 48.51% 63.35% 12.92% 14.44%
2005 69.36% 68.23% 41.93% 42.32% 44.67% 59.53% 15.29% 17.29%
2006 71.73% 69.71% 62.24% 49.94% 44.79% 59.37% 16.01% 18.18%
2007 72.94% 71.72% 63.03% 57.16% 44.84% 57.04% 20.51% 23.10%
2008 83.26% 82.25% 62.33% 59.26% 44.99% 55.02% 22.42% 24.94%
2009 82.06% 80.70% 62.60% 59.01% 46.36% 54.51% 25.90% 27.85%
2010 77.62% 78.09% 58.87% 56.04% 47.67% 53.59% 31.07% 34.18%
2011 76.58% 76.72% 58.11% 54.79% 48.82% 54.34% 31.92% 35.17%
2012 79.20% 78.85% 61.16% 60.12% 51.50% 56.06% 33.25% 36.36%
2013 79.22% 78.40% 65.86% 64.78% 63.81% 67.49% 42.47% 47.14%
2014 78.84% 77.04% 79.50% 78.86% 66.12% 70.21% 49.96% 54.83%
2015 81.52% 76.68% 82.69% 79.40% 88.22% 88.11% 50.57% 55.90%
2016 82.77% 75.78% 83.89% 78.56% 89.21% 90.12% 45.75% 51.66%
2017 88.36% 79.71% 89.51% 83.79% 94.02% 94.09% 44.59% 53.73%
Table 1.10: Correlations of Independent Variables: Sustainability Disclosure Regulations
This table shows the correlations between the mandatory sustainability disclosure regulation variables used in
this paper as independent variables, measured as explained above. *** denotes that the coefficients are
significantly different from zero at 0.1%.
manenv mansoc mangov mangen
manenv 1
mansoc 0.645∗∗∗ 1
mangov 0.246∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 1
mangen -0.0290∗∗∗ -0.0564∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ 1
Table 1.11: Cramér’s V between Country and Sustainability Disclosure Regulation Variables,
and Correlation Coefficient between HDI and Sustainability Disclosure Regulation Variables
This table shows the values for Cramér’s V between the Country and Sustainability disclosure regulation
variables, and the correlation coefficient between HDI and Sustainability disclosure regulation variables. In the
first column *** denotes that the Chi-square test indicates that the relationship between the variables is
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deduced that it may be possible to include them simultaneously in the estimations. However, for
the sake of consistency with the other variables, we choose not to do so. Therefore, we estimate
different models for each of the five dependent variables, including country, continent, currency,
regulation, tax haven or HDI variable(s) in each of them.
4 Methodology and results
This section presents the methodologies used to draw up the estimations and the results obtained.
4.1 Methodology
We estimate hybrid panel data models (Allison, 2009), which are generalised linear mixed models,
with robust standard errors clustered by company, using the ‘xthybrid’ function in Stata by
Schunck and Perales (2017). Hybrid models are less prone to produce biased estimators than
random effects models. They calculate two estimators (within cluster -W- and between cluster
-B-) for the time-variant independent variables, as long as the two coefficients are not proven
to be equal. “Within” estimators show the effect of changes in time-variant variables for a
company over the period, while “between” estimators show the effect of differences in those
variables between companies. For those variables where the two estimators are equal and for
time-invariant regressors the model gives the random effects estimator -R-. Time fixed-effects
are included in all the models, and always have a significantly positive effect on the variable
explained. As found in Schunck and Perales (2017) and adapted to our case, a general equation
of the hybrid model would be the following:
g(µit) = α+ βW (xit − xi) + βBxi + βRxit + γci + ui (1.3)
where g(· ) is the link function, α is the constant, βW is the coefficient vector for the “within”
effects, βB is the coefficient vector for the “between” effects, xit is the vector of time-variant
variables for company i in year t, xi is the vector of time-means of the xit, βR is the coefficient
vector for the time-variant variables when βW and βB are statistically equal, γ is the coefficient
vector for the time-invariant variables ci and ui is the random intercept.
They are ‘generalised’ models, so it is possible to estimate them for dependent variables that
follow different distributions. Taking into account the type of data in our dependent variables,
we consider three different distributions in the model specification: negative binomial for the
count variable which was very over-dispersed (ENV ), Poisson for the count variables that were
not (SOC and GOV ), both with a log link; and Gaussian with an identity link for the principal
components (PCENVSOC and PCGOV ).
Finally, we include as regressors the financial variables (size, profitability, leverageta, ppenetta
and mtbv), one of the two sector variable groups (sector or sensind) and one of the six country
variable groups (country, continent, currency, regulation, taxhaven or hdi). The selection of these
variables is explained in Section Two and the reasons for not including all of them simultaneously
are given in Section Three.
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Altogether, we estimate twelve models for each of the five dependent variables: two sector
variable groups combined with six country variable groups.
4.2 Results
The tables included in this section show only the results of the estimations with the two PC
combinations (PCENVSOC and PCGOV ) as the dependent variable because, as shown in Table
1.4, they summarise the other three efficiently. However, we also give information about the
results for the count variables, although it is not included in the tables. Moreover, we only show
the results of the estimations using Economic Sector dummies (the reference sector is Energy),
but we comment on the results using Sensitive Industry as the sector variable. Thus, the tables
are organised in six columns for the sake of readability, each showing the estimations for one
country variable group. The variables for which coefficients are shown are, generally, only those
that have at least one which is significantly different from zero. The results for only some of the
countries are presented (the reference country is Australia -AU-), specifically the 6-8 countries
with the 3-4 highest and 3-4 lowest coefficients, as long as there are at least 20 companies
from that country in the sample. The same 3 currency dummies (the reference currency is the
Australian Dollar -AU$-) are shown in all the tables: the Euro (the only currency shared evenly
by companies from several countries), the US Dollar (because of its economic importance in
the world) and the South African Rand (because it is the currency of one of the pioneers in
non-financial reporting). Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
We calculate the VIFs (Variance Inflation Factors) for the regressors in our models and
find that they are all below the threshold of 10, which means that there is no multicollinearity
problem in them. As goodness-of-fit measures we include AIC (Akaike Information Criterion),
BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion)11 and the Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo R2 in the tables.
The latter is very high in all cases12.
Environmental and Social Principal Component
Table 1.12 shows the results of the estimations for the environmental and social principal com-
ponent, PCENVSOC. In general, the coefficients for the same variables in different models are
similar.
We find that size has significantly positive coefficients both within and between. This shows
that as a company grows it reports more environmental and social information and that bigger
companies generally report more such information. The “within” effect of profitability, financial
situation (leverageta) and growth opportunities (mtbv) is not statistically significant, which
shows that companies report neither more nor less environmental and social information as
their profitability or growth opportunities increase or decrease, or as their financial situation
gets better or worse. However, their “between” effects are significantly different from zero: they
are positive in the case of profitability and growth opportunities, and negative in the case of
11For both criteria, one model is a better fit than another if the value of the IC is smaller.
12As stated in McFadden (1978), ‘values between 0.2 and 0.4 represent an excellent fit’.
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leverage. Therefore, more profitable companies, companies with higher growth opportunities
and those less in debt tend to report more environmental and social data. The effect of capital
intensity (ppenetta) on environmental and social reporting is less clear. The “within” coefficients
for capital intensity are negative, which means that becoming more capital intensive tends to
make companies report less environmental and social information, but the “between” coefficients
are positive and larger than the “within”, which shows that more capital intensive companies
tend to report more environmental and social information.
The results obtained also show that it is the Basic Materials sector that reports the most
environmental and social information. Its coefficients are significantly positive in comparison to
the Energy sector. Companies in the Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services, Telecommunication
Services and, especially, Financials sectors report significantly less than those in the Energy
sector. The estimations for Sensitive Industry instead of sector dummies produce very similar
results, with Sensitive Industry being significantly positive, as expected.
Companies from China, Peru, the USA and Argentina are at the lowest reporting levels of
the whole sample, while Finnish companies are on top, closely followed by Spanish, French and
South African companies. This is consistent with the results per continent, which show Africa
and Europe to be the continents which report most in our sample and North America to be
the worst performer. The results for Africa may be surprising at first, but it must be noted
that, as shown in Appendix B, the African companies in the sample come basically from South
Africa. For currencies, belonging to the European Monetary Union can be shown to have a
positive effect on environmental and social reporting. However, the South African Rand has
one of the largest effects (although not presented in Table 1.12, the coefficient for the Pound
Sterling is the highest of all). The US Dollar has a significantly negative effect, showing that
companies reporting in US Dollars (mostly companies from the USA) report significantly less
environmental and social information than others.
As expected, we find that the introduction of a mandatory general sustainability disclosure
regulation13 increases environmental and social reporting and that companies in countries with
such regulations tend to report more environmental and social information.
Surprisingly, the country a company is from being a tax haven has a significantly positive
effect on environmental and social reporting. This might be due to those countries trying to
offset the lack of reporting of other types of information (such as governance information) by
developing environmentally conscious financial markets.
A higher HDI in the country of a company makes it report more environmental and so-
cial information, but companies from countries with higher HDI report less information (the
“between” coefficient is significantly negative although smaller than the “within” coefficient in
absolute terms). The former is consistent with our thoughts but the latter is not. However, this
result might be due to the fact that about one third of the sample comprises companies from the
USA. As mentioned above, they report significantly less environmental and social information
13The effect of the specific reporting regulations manenv and mansoc is analysed in the subsections on the
environmental and social count variables, respectively. (Remember that they could not be included simultaneously
due to multicollinearity). The results for PCENVSOC when either of them is included are similar to those set
out below.
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than others and the USA has quite a high HDI (above the mean for the sample in almost all
years).
Taking everything into account, our hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5, H6a, H6b, H7a, H7b, H7c
and H7d can be confirmed for environmental and social reporting analysed together. H4 and
H7f, cannot be confirmed, because we obtain mixed results. Finally, for H7e the results are the
opposite of what we expected.
Table 1.12: Results of Estimations for the Environmental and Social Principal Component
This table shows the results of the estimations for the environmental and social principal component. * and **
denote that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
PCENVSOC
Country Continent Currency






0.140 0.140 0.140 0.143 0.142 0.134
(10.69)** (10.71)** (10.69)** (10.91)** (10.81)** (10.24)**
size (B)
0.299 0.301 0.299 0.323 0.308 0.282
(46.30)** (46.18)** (46.61)** (47.80)** (45.45)** (40.51)**
profitability (B)
0.338 0.351 0.332 0.507 0.532 0.387
(4.86)** (4.97)** (4.74)** (6.33)** (6.54)** (5.28)**
leverageta (B)
-0.424 -0.409 -0.410 -0.473 -0.525 -0.489
(9.14)** (8.35)** (8.79)** (8.82)** (9.49)** (9.28)**
ppenetta (W)
-0.195 -0.195 -0.195 -0.193 -0.197 -0.159
(3.21)** (3.22)** (3.21)** (3.18)** (3.24)** (2.61)**
ppenetta (B)
0.384 0.405 0.377 0.316 0.334 0.320
(11.01)** (11.16)** (10.72)** (7.84)** (7.99)** (8.01)**
mtbv (B)
0.013 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.006
(5.01)** (4.83)** (5.28)** (2.85)** (2.07)* (2.15)*
Basic Materials
0.322 0.324 0.311 0.394 0.401 0.381
(7.23)** (6.85)** (6.92)** (7.43)** (7.42)** (7.29)**
Cyclical Consumer
Goods & Services
-0.175 -0.182 -0.177 -0.076 -0.157 -0.136
(4.28)** (4.23)** (4.31)** (1.56) (3.16)** (2.84)**
Non-cyclical Consumer
Goods & Services
-0.094 -0.094 -0.109 0.029 -0.040 -0.053
(1.96) (1.86) (2.27)* (0.52) (0.70) (0.95)
Financials
-0.666 -0.701 -0.675 -0.641 -0.702 -0.663
(17.17)** (17.27)** (17.37)** (13.86)** (14.71)** (14.36)**
Technology
-0.011 -0.004 -0.018 0.019 -0.127 -0.103
(0.25) (0.09) (0.40) (0.36) (2.35)* (1.97)*
Telecommunication Services
-0.209 -0.241 -0.224 -0.058 -0.082 -0.133
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Country Continent Currency

























































-177.813 -177.705 -177.830 -167.441 -177.157 -131.396
(53.62)** (53.67)** (53.69)** (47.31)** (53.23)** (22.70)**
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AIC 70,839.02 71,507.97 70,945.22 72,588.85 73,245.98 72,633.44
BIC 71,470.39 71,753.51 71,480.13 72,808.08 73,456.44 72,852.67
Adjusted McFadden’s
Pseudo R2
0.4794 0.4746 0.4787 0.4666 0.4618 0.4663
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Governance Principal Component
Table 1.13 shows the results of the estimations for the governance principal component, PCGOV,
where, again, there are no big differences between the coefficients of the variables that are
included in more than one model.
Size has a significantly positive effect on governance reporting, just as it has on environmental
and social reporting, but some of the “between” coefficients are negative, though smaller than
the positive “within” coefficients. The results for profitability are different from those obtained
for environmental and social reporting: in most cases there are no significant effects. The effect
of the financial situation is negative and the “within” and “between” coefficients are equal in
some of the models, showing that greater leverage leads to less governance reporting. However,
in some of the cases where they are not equal the “between” coefficient is significantly positive,
which means that more indebted companies tend to report more governance information than
less indebted ones (or at least the same amount). Capital intensity seems to have a negative
effect on governance reporting, unlike its effect on environmental and social reporting. In most
cases, the “between” effect is equal to the “within” effect, showing that becoming more capital
intensive makes companies less prone to report governance information and that companies
which are more capital intensive also report less governance information. Increases in growth
opportunities seem to reduce the quantity of governance information reported with a significantly
negative “within” coefficient. In some cases the “between” coefficient is positive, which means
that companies with larger growth opportunities tend to report more governance information.
Table 1.13 shows that it is the Energy sector (and possibly the Telecommunication Services
sector, although the effect is not as clear) which reports most governance information, while in
environmental and social reporting it is Basic Materials that reports the most. The estimations
with Sensitive Industry instead of sector dummies show that Sensitive Industry is not statistically
relevant for governance reporting, unlike its effect on environmental and social information.
An analysis of which countries’ companies report the most governance information points not
only to South Africa again but also to the USA and the United Kingdom, which has the highest
coefficient. Peruvian, Japanese and Argentinian companies report the least. These results are
reflected in the estimations using the continent dummies, which show that companies from North
America report the most, followed by African and Oceanian companies, while Asian and South
American companies report the least. Companies that report in Euros report significantly less
than companies that report in Australian Dollars or in US Dollars. Companies that report in
South African Rands report slightly more than those that report in Australian Dollars.
The results for specific governance disclosure regulations are mixed. The “between” coeffi-
cient is positive, which means that companies in countries with such regulations tend to report
more governance information, but the “within” coefficient is negative (although much smaller),
showing that the entry in force of such regulations reduces governance reporting. This might
be due to the nature of the regulations, which are more specific and cover fewer variables to
be reported than general sustainability regulations. In fact, the variable for mandatory gen-
eral sustainability reporting regulations has “within” and “between” coefficients which are both
significantly positive.
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The country a company is from being a tax haven has a significantly negative effect on
governance reporting, as expected, because governance reporting requires transparency and lack
of transparency is a characteristic of tax havens.
Last, HDI has a significantly positive “between” effect and a “within” effect that is statisti-
cally non-existent, which is consistent with our initial thoughts.
All in all, our hypotheses H6a, H7a, H7b, H7c, H7e and H7f can be confirmed for governance
reporting, while the results obtained for profitability reject H2. As for H1, H3, H5 and H7d, we
obtain mixed results. For H4 the results are the opposite of what we expected.
Table 1.13: Results of Estimations for the Governance Principal Component
This table shows the results of the estimations for the governance principal component. * and ** denote that
the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
PCGOV
Country Continent Currency






0.152 0.147 0.151 0.140 0.147 0.146
(15.80)** (15.15)** (15.73)** (14.52)** (15.14)** (15.05)**
size (B)
0.078 0.044 0.078 0.028 -0.026 -0.022





-0.130 -0.132 -0.130 -0.128
(3.30)** (3.39)** (3.31)** (3.26)**
leverageta (B)
0.003 0.087 0.183 0.199





-0.085 -0.120 -0.087 -0.109 -0.121 -0.123
(3.73)** (3.74)** (3.69)** (3.12)** (3.38)** (3.43)**
mtbv (W)
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(4.40)** (4.42)** (4.40)** (4.51)** (4.42)** (4.39)**
mtbv (B)
0.002 0.014 0.002 0.015 0.019 0.022
(1.28) (6.56)** (1.34) (5.93)** (7.15)** (8.07)**
Basic Materials
0.009 -0.116 0.001 -0.211 -0.230 -0.220
(0.45) (3.31)** (0.02) (4.88)** (5.23)** (4.96)**
Industrials
-0.017 -0.176 -0.017 -0.329 -0.298 -0.326
(0.81) (5.11)** (0.76) (8.12)** (7.00)** (7.71)**
Cyclical Consumer
Goods & Services
-0.002 -0.145 -0.010 -0.256 -0.209 -0.241
(0.12) (4.20)** (0.44) (6.23)** (4.91)** (5.70)**
Non-cyclical Consumer
Goods & Services
0.008 -0.115 0.016 -0.332 -0.293 -0.289
(0.34) (2.66)** (0.62) (6.37)** (5.48)** (5.42)**
Financials
-0.104 -0.112 -0.113 -0.225 -0.104 -0.117
(4.83)** (3.49)** (4.84)** (5.88)** (2.72)** (3.07)**
Healthcare
0.033 -0.084 0.031 -0.125 -0.086 -0.122
(1.40) (2.27)* (1.20) (2.88)** (1.91) (2.73)**
Technology
0.023 -0.224 0.026 -0.348 -0.249 -0.308
(0.96) (6.13)** (1.00) (7.25)** (5.27)** (6.51)**
continued on next page
33
Finance for a sustainable world Chapter 1
continued from previous page
PCGOV
Country Continent Currency






0.121 0.041 0.108 -0.238 -0.166 -0.125
(3.11)** (0.68) (2.64)** (3.71)** (2.59)** (1.97)*
Utilities
-0.073 -0.053 -0.084 -0.304 -0.270 -0.242






























































-159.599 -161.935 -159.914 -166.607 -161.134 -158.996
(68.95)** (68.16)** (68.90)** (65.49)** (67.10)** (39.44)**
continued on next page
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PCGOV
Country Continent Currency





Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AIC 46,648.65 53,576.74 47,231.27 55,583.66 56,925.52 56,865.73
BIC 47,253.71 53,813.50 47,739.88 55,802.89 57,118.43 57,067.42
Adjusted McFadden’s
Pseudo R2
0.6556 0.6037 0.6512 0.5885 0.5789 0.5793
Environmental Count Variable
Most of the results for the environmental count variable are the same as for the environmental
and social principal component, though there are a few minor differences.
First, for capital intensity only the “between” effect is significantly positive, with the “within”
effect being statistically zero, which means that H4 can be accepted for environmental report-
ing. The “within” coefficients for mtbv are negative and when the “within” and “between”
coefficients are equal the coefficient obtained is negative. However, when they are not equal the
positive “between” coefficient is larger. This means that H5 is neither accepted nor rejected for
environmental reporting.
Apart from the Basic Materials sector, Industrials, Non-cyclical Consumer Goods & Services,
Technology and Utilities also seem to perform better than the Energy sector in terms of envi-
ronmental reporting. France and Spain are no longer among the top performing countries and
the United Kingdom and Sweden can be found along with South Africa and Finland. We were
able to include both manenv and mangen in the models, and our finding is that the introduc-
tion of mandatory environmental information reporting regulations has a significantly positive
effect, but that, generally, companies from countries where such regulations exists report less
environmental information, and this latter effect is larger. The results for mandatory general
disclosure regulations are similar to those for PCENVSOC, with a positive “between” effect
but a “within” coefficient that is statistically zero. This means that H7d cannot be accepted
for environmental reporting. Finally, the statistically negative “between” coefficient for hdi is
bigger than its statistically positive “within” effect, so H7f cannot be accepted for environmental
reporting.
Social Count Variable
The results for the social count variable also resemble those obtained for the environmental and
social principal component, with the main differences explained below.
There are three differences in the financial variables. First, the “within” coefficient for lever-
ageta is significantly negative instead of statistically insignificant, which means that becoming
further indebted makes a company report less social information. Second, the “within” effect of
capital intensity is statistically zero instead of negative so H4 can be accepted for social reporting.
Third, increases in growth opportunities seem to make companies do less social reporting. How-
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ever, the “between” coefficient is significantly positive and greater than the negative “within”
coefficient. Due to these mixed results, H5 cannot be accepted for social reporting.
As with environmental reporting, the companies that report most social information are
South African, Finnish and British. The worst four performing countries in terms of social
reporting are Peru, China, Argentina and Japan. Additionally, being domiciled in the Eurozone
seems to have neither a positive nor a negative effect on social reporting compared to companies
that report in Australian Dollars. The results are again mixed for the effect of regulations.
Companies in countries with mandatory social information reporting regulations seem to report
less social information, and the introduction of such regulations seems to reduce social reporting.
As with ENV, the introduction of a mandatory general information reporting regulation seems
to have no effect on social reporting, but companies in countries with such regulations tend to
report more social information. Due to those mixed results, H7d cannot be accepted for social
reporting. The coefficient for taxhaven is statistically zero for social reporting, which means
that companies from countries that are tax havens do not report more or less social information
than companies from other countries. This leads to the rejection H7e for social reporting.
Governance Count Variable
When the governance count variable is analysed instead of the governance principal component
only a couple of differences emerge.
First, the “between” coefficients for capital intensity are statistically zero in some cases.
Second, the coefficient for Sensitive Industry is significantly positive rather than statistically
zero, which means that H6b can be accepted for governance reporting. However, this raises a
conflict because it is not accepted for PCGOV.
In terms of continents, North America does not outperform Oceania, but Oceania outper-
forms Africa. The companies that perform best in this case are, as for PCGOV, the United
Kingdom, the USA and South Africa, but Canada is the second-best performer. Moreover, the
“within” coefficient for the mandatory governance regulation is statistically zero. Finally, the
“within” coefficient of hdi is significantly positive instead of statistically zero.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyses the different non-financial reporting patterns of 6,578 companies from 10
different sectors all around the world for 2002-2017. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first
study to analyse such a big dataset, and to perform both separate and combined analyses for
environmental, social and governance information. We start out with 73 different non-financial
information variables, so we use agglutinative measures to reduce the dimensions of our analysis:
environmental, social and governance count variables are reported, along with environmental and
social and governance principal components.
The models estimated vary due to the different distributions of the count variables and the
principal components. However, they are all hybrid panel data models with robust standard
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errors clustered by company that include time fixed-effects. The independent variables that
explain non-financial reporting in our models are financial (those usually found in the literature),
sectoral and related to the country in which each company is domiciled.
One of our main findings is that reporting patterns are different for environmental and social
information on the one hand and governance information on the other. This is especially clear
for the following examples and effects.
First, in countries such as South Africa (as expected from an ESG reporting pioneer) and
Finland environmental and social reporting is remarkably higher than in other countries. South
Africa is also one of the best performers in terms of governance disclosure, which proves that it
is possible to do well in all three dimensions of ESG reporting, but it is in the United Kingdom
where there is most governance reporting. The USA follows close behind. In fact, the case of the
USA stands out: there is significantly less environmental and social disclosure but significantly
more governance reporting than in other countries. The first part might not be surprising as
the USA is known to be ‘lagging behind in regulations’ concerning sustainability (T̂ınjală et al.,
2015). However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is known to be a significant governance reporting reg-
ulation, which has led companies in the USA to report more governance information (Krishnan
and Visvanathan, 2007). The worst performers overall are Argentina and Peru.
Second, companies in the Euro Area seem to report more environmental information but
less governance information than others. The greater environmental reporting is in line with
the fact that the European Union is ahead of other regions in sustainability reporting regulation
(T̂ınjală et al., 2015), but the reasons for the lower governance reporting should be analysed in
more depth in future research.
Another difference is that companies established in a country that can be considered as a
tax haven report less governance information but more environmental information, which is
not what has been found before by authors such as Preuss (2012). The greater environmental
reporting is probably due to the wish to offset the lack of governance reporting.
In terms of sectors, companies in sensitive industries tend to report more environmental and
social information, as found in Stolowy and Paugam (2018). When analysing sectors one by one,
we find that companies in the Basic Materials sector report significantly more environmental and
social information than others, while companies in the Energy sector report more governance
information. The Financial sector underperforms in all types of non-financial reporting. These
results are in line with those in Brammer and Pavelin (2006).
We have obtained no conclusive results as to what types of regulation increase non-financial
reporting. However, mandatory general sustainability reporting regulations seem to have the
most stable positive effect, so we conclude that regulations of that type may encourage companies
to report more non-financial information. Moreover, a higher HDI seems to be related to higher
levels of governance reporting.
As for company characteristics, bigger and more profitable companies clearly report more
non-financial information, especially environmental and social. The former is widely supported
in the existing literature, but the positive effect of profitability has not usually been found
(Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Clarkson et al., 2008; Stanny and
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Ely, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011; D’Amico et al., 2016, among others), perhaps because scholars
have not separated “within” and “between” effects when analysing reporting. Less indebted
companies usually report more environmental and social information (as found by Brammer
and Pavelin (2006) and others) but not governance information. Nevertheless, becoming more
indebted seems to reduce the amount of governance data that a company reports, which is a
topic that may merit further research. Companies that are more capital intensive report more
environmental and social information, but becoming more capital intensive seems to reduce
reporting of those types (although that effect is smaller). In addition, a higher capital intensity
tends to reduce the amount of governance information reported. These results are consistent
with the findings of previous studies into environmental reporting (Clarkson et al., 2008, 2011;
Stolowy and Paugam, 2018), and add to them the finding of a negative effect on governance
reporting, which should be researched in more depth. Finally, companies that have larger
growth opportunities tend to report more non-financial information, but an increase in such
opportunities produces a reduction in reporting. The former is generally the stronger effect,
which is in line with previous publications (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009a,b; Prado-Lorenzo and
Garćıa-Sánchez, 2010).
From the results obtained in this study and previous research, it can be concluded that the
cost of generating ESG information is high, so bigger and more profitable companies report
most. Thus, if policy advice for increasing non-financial reporting were to be given, it would
be to provide funding to those companies that struggle most to generate non-financial data. It
would also be positive to provide training on how to prepare and generate such data.
A further research step could be to perform the analysis with regulation variables, but
measure their scope in terms of the quantity of ESG variables that must be reported, in the
hope that this will clarify the mixed results obtained in this study. It also would be interesting
to analyse best-in-class cases in more depth, so as to be able to establish specific measures for
increasing non-financial reporting in the future. Running a comparative case study of countries
that behave differently such as Finland and the USA is another possible way of filling that gap
in the literature. Another future line of research could be to perform the analysis decomposing
the sectors into subsectors, because some of the economic sectors in the TRBC are very diverse
in terms of non-financial reporting. For example, the Energy sector includes both Oil & Gas and
Renewable Energy companies, which are assumed to have different reporting patterns. Finally,
it would also be of great interest to know whether companies that perform better in non-financial
terms tend to disclose more ESG information or not.
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Fŕıas-Aceituno, J. V., Rodŕıguez-Ariza, L., and Garcia-Sánchez, I. M. (2014). Explanatory
factors of integrated sustainability and financial reporting. Business strategy and the envi-
ronment, 23(1):56–72.
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7 Appendices
A List of ESG variables (and their codes)
This table shows the variable codes and names and the explanation of the original ESG variables associated
with them.
Variable Code Variable Name Explanation of original variable (non-binary)





















Total amount of ozone depleting (CFC-11 equiv-
alents) substances emitted
NOxEm NOx Emissions Total amount of NOx emissions
SOxEm SOx Emissions Total amount of SOx emissions
VOCEm VOC Emissions
Total amount of volatile organic compounds
(VOC) emissions








Total recycled and reused waste
HazWas Hazardous Waste Total amount of hazardous waste produced




Total weight of water pollutant emissions
ISOEMSCP
ISO 14000 or EMS
Certified Percent
The percentage of company sites or subsidiaries














Total CO2 and CO2 equivalent Scope Three emis-
sions
continued on next page
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The equivalent of the CO2 offsets, credits and al-
lowances purchased and/or produced by the com-




Total amount of environmental R&D spending
(without clean up and remediation costs).
EnUTot Energy Use Total Total direct and indirect energy consumption








Total fresh water withdrawal
WatRec Water Recycled Amount of water recycled or reused
Panel B: Social variables
AlcRev Alcohol Revenues
The revenues generated by the company from the
sale of alcohol.
TobRev Tobacco Revenues





Number of FDA warning letters received by the
company.
ProdDel Product Delays
Total number of products or services which have
been delayed.
NappDrug Non Approved Drug
Total number of drugs which have not been ap-
proved by regulators or similar official bodies.




Total amount of political donations, support of
political candidates or contributions to parties as
reported by the company.




Percentage of new women employees.




The score of the company in the HRC corporate
equality index from the Human Rights Campaign
Foundation.
DisEmp Disabled Employees





Total value of salaries and wages paid to all em-
ployees and officers, including all benefits, as re-
ported by the company in its CSR reporting.
continued on next page
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Number of employees as reported by the company




Percentage of employees represented by indepen-





Percentage of employee turnover.
AnLay Announced Layoffs
Total number of layoffs announced by the com-
pany.





Total hours of health & safety training
TotInjR Total Injury Rate
Total number of injuries and fatalities including
no-lost-time injuries relative to one million hours
worked.
AcciT Accidents Total
Number of injuries and fatalities reported by em-





Number of occupational diseases or any disease
caused by continued exposure to conditions inher-
ent in a person’s occupation reported relative to
one million hours worked.
EmpFat Employee Fatalities
Number of employee fatalities resulting from op-
erational accidents.
ConFat Contractor Fatalities





Total number of injuries that caused the employ-
ees and contractors to lose at least a working day
relative to one million hours worked.
LostWD Lost Working Days





Average hours of training per year per employee.
TrainCT Training Costs Total






The percentage of employee satisfaction as re-
ported by the company.
continued on next page
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The percentage of customer satisfaction as re-
ported by the company




Percentage of independent board members on the





Percentage of non-executive board members on






Percentage of independent board members on







Percentage of non-executive board members on






Percentage of independent board members on the







Percentage of non-executive board members on









The average overall attendance percentage at




The average overall attendance percentage at
board committee meetings as reported by the
company.
BoSize Board Size





The smallest interval of years in which the board













The maximum time frame for the board member’s
targets to reach full compensation.
continued on next page
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The total compensation of non-executive board






The total compensation paid to all senior execu-





The percentage of the company’s activities cov-









The minimum interval (in days) prior to the next
shareholder meeting beyond which a shareholder
proposal will not be accepted
B List of Economic Sectors (and their codes)
This table shows the codes and the names of the different sectors represented in the sample.
Economic Sector Code Name of Economic Sector
S 50 Energy
S 51 Basic Materials
S 52 Industrials
S 53 Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services




S 58 Telecommunications Services
S 59 Utilities
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C List of countries
This table shows the different countries from which companies come and the number of companies from each
country included in the sample.
Africa
EGYPT 10 NIGERIA 1
MOROCCO 3 SOUTH AFRICA 144
Asia
ABU DHABI 5 MALAYSIA 55
CHINA 102 PHILIPPINES 27
DUBAI 8 QATAR 12
HONG KONG 184 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 37
INDIA 105 SAUDI ARABIA 12
INDONESIA 38 SINGAPORE 56
ISRAEL 18 SOUTH KOREA 127
JAPAN 454 TAIWAN 142
KAZAKHSTAN 1 THAILAND 39
KUWAIT 10 TURKEY 27
Europe
AUSTRIA 19 IRELAND 16
BELGIUM 31 ITALY 61
CYPRUS 1 NETHERLANDS 46
CZECH REPUBLIC 3 NORWAY 27
DENMARK 29 POLAND 33
FINLAND 27 PORTUGAL 12
FRANCE 111 SPAIN 58
GERMANY 108 SWEDEN 74
GREECE 22 SWITZERLAND 72
HUNGARY 4 UNITED KINGDOM 433
North America
BERMUDA 1 MEXICO 41




ARGENTINA 24 CHILE 41
BRAZIL 99 COLOMBIA 20
CAYMAN ISLANDS 1 PERU 27
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D List of Currencies (and their codes)
This table shows the codes and the names of the different currencies of the companies included in the sample.
Currency Code Currency Name Currency Code Currency Name
AU$ Australian Dollar MD Moroccan Dirham
AP Argentinian Peso MP Mexican Peso
C Brazilian Real NG Nigerian Niara
C$ Canadian Dollar NK Norwegian Krone
CE Chilean Peso PP Philippine Peso
CH Chinese Yuen Renminbi PS Peruvian Sol
CK Czech Koruna PZ Polish Zloty
CP Colombian Peso Q Qatari Rial
DK Danish Krone R South African Rand
e(E) Euro RI Indonesian Rupiah
ED United Arab Emirates Dirham S$ Singaporean Dollar
EL Egyptian Pound SF Swiss Franc
HF Hungarian Forint SK Swedish Krona
IL Israeli Pound SR Saudi Arabian Riyal
IR Indian Rupee TB Thai Baht
K$ Hongkonger Dollar TL Turkish Lira
KD Kuwaiti Dinar TW New Taiwanese Dollar
KT Kazakhstani Tenge US$ United States Dollar
KW South Korean Won UR Russian Rouble
L British Pound Y Japanese Yen
M$ Malaysian Ringgit
E List of Tax Havens
This table shows the countries included in the sample which are considered as tax havens and the number of

















Measures for Sustainable Investment Decisions and
Business Strategy
A Triple Bottom Line Approach
Published in: Business Strategy and the Environment, Volume 27, Issue 1, pages 16–38
1 Introduction
Traditionally, when making investment decisions, investors take into consideration the classic
measures of profitability and risk (Markowitz, 1952; Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969; Li and
Ng, 2000), which are concerned with the economic aspects of investment. However, in the last
few decades, and especially since the first definitions of sustainability1 (Ehrenfeld, 2008) and
sustainable development [contained in WCED (1987)] were drawn up, environmental, social
and corporate governance (ESG) issues have become more important for both companies and
individuals. This is due to increased awareness of the fact that economic activities also generate
externalities (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960; Turvey, 1963) that affect society. However, for a long
time this effect was not taken into account by those who carry out the activities in question,
because it did not directly affect their private costs.
By making an investment, investors are financing the activities that a company carries out
and are, therefore, essential for the company’s survival. If investors consider not only economic
factors but also environmental and/or social factors when making investment decisions their
analysis will be much more accurate. This is the standpoint of the so-called triple bottom line
1Sustainability has three pillars: economic, social and environmental.
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(TBL) approach, first introduced by Elkington (1997) and also explained by other authors such
as Slaper and Hall (2011). In fact, socially responsible investment (SRI) is a promising line of
research (Renneboog et al., 2008).
On top of that, financial stakeholders can make it more probable for companies to pay atten-
tion to sustainability problems that they consider important (Neugebauer et al., 2016) and to
address them ‘by planned strategy making’ (McWilliams et al., 2016). For Jansson et al. (2017),
in order for this to happen, a company must be market oriented. Moreover, a company that
‘incorporates sustainability into its marketing strategy could have a differential advantage over
the competition’ (Ferrell et al., 2010; Crittenden et al., 2011). However, sometimes, when com-
panies try to comply with new regulations, their efforts are disconnected from strategic planning
(Mårtensson and Westerberg, 2016). Therefore, as Beckmann et al. (2014) state, ‘responsibil-
ity management’ can (and should) be seen ‘as an integral part of any corporations strategic
management ’. In fact, business strategy has to take into account the concept of sustainable de-
velopment and be adapted in order to satisfy the ‘increasing environmental and social demands’
(Welford, 2016). This way, companies are more profitable and more likely to survive in the long
run (Jansson et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, for investors and companies to be able to consider these factors, they need
data and measures to help them to make sense of the data.
A slow but steady data disclosure process started towards the end of the 20th century (with
the creation of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and other systems) and indeed continues
today. In the beginning the disclosure of ESG data, for example taking part in the GRI,
was voluntary. The United Nations Global Compacts, another worldwide initiative in which
reporting is mandatory in order to remain in it, was created in 2001 and has since promoted data
disclosure with good results, as Williams (2004) anticipated and Rasche (2011) later confirmed.
Later, legislators started to require companies to publish ESG data. In fact, quotting United
Nations Global Compact (2014): ‘Once only a voluntary activity, there is a trend towards
mandatory non-financial reporting. For example, in South Africa, China, Denmark, Finland,
Indonesia, and most recently the European Union there are requirements in place for companies,
be they large, publicly-listed or state-owned companies, to disclose ESG practices’. In the case
of the European Union, Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related
reports of certain types of undertakings2 obliges large companies with more than 500 employees,
such as listed companies and banks, to disclose information regarding environmental, social and
other matters as well as issues concerning human rights and anticorruption measures affecting
their company. This has led to what has come to be called ‘integrated reporting’ (Jensen
and Berg, 2012; Abeysekera, 2013; Cheng et al., 2014; De Villiers et al., 2014), the creation of
single reports that include both economic and non-economic information about companies. Such
initiatives have increased the disclosure of non-economic information by companies, as Ioannou
2Also taking into account amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (Directive 2013/34/EU) as amended by Directive
2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU
as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (Directive
2014/95/EU).
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and Serafeim (2011) show. However, ESG data disclosure is not consistent from one country
and one sector to another (Peiró-Signes et al., 2012).
Reporting itself may be considered a strategic movement to improve a company’s reputation,
that is, a part of a legitimation strategy. However, as Lai et al. (2016) state, the complexity
of the kind of reporting considered and as a consequence the degree of involvement of different
parts of the company needed to create the report, explain if the reporting is being done within
a legitimation strategy or not.
Although increasing data disclosure is very positive, for most investors data are just data:
they do not reveal whether one company is more sustainable than another. As Clapp et al.
(2016) mention in their report, ‘investors need clear and tailored information to enable climate-
smart financial decisions’. The same goes for other environmental and social variables. In
fact, as Cohen et al. (2015) state, investors prefer ‘nonfinancial information that is concise,
comprehensive, comparable, [...]’. This is where measures have a part to play (Escrig-Olmedo
et al., 2017).
To date, there have been many attempts to create measures for the ‘integration of economic,
social and corporate governance performance and reporting in enterprises’ (Hřeb́ıček et al.,
2011b). These same authors proposed a series of environmental indicators in Hřeb́ıček et al.
(2011a), but did not really present any integrating measure that made the companies compa-
rable. Kocmanová and Dočekalová (2012) also highlight the importance of creating economic
indicators of the environmental, social and governance performance of companies but fail to
present any formula for simple calculation; their study is also based on a survey rather than
objective data. Some authors, such as some researchers belonging to the ECRI Ethics in Fi-
nance & Social Value group, have conducted private analyses of the sustainability of some firms.
However, such analysis is based on private data, is not necessarily subject of public disclosure
and cannot feasibly be carried out by investors. Closer to our objective, Sustainalytics and
similar companies have created ESG scores that are included in databases such as Datastream
or Morningstar, but the way that scores are calculated is not fully disclosed (they outline the
process but do not describe the calculations in detail). Furthermore, they do not match closely
the interests of stakeholders (Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2017). Herbohn et al. (2014) also create a
sustainability measure, which rates companies according to a modified version of the framework
proposed by International Finance Corporation (2001), based on indicators scaled in levels and
not on continuous variables. Moreover, it does not give a reference of comparison to the sec-
tor’s performance. The closest measure to the one that we sought can be found in the paper
by Hahn and Figge (2011), which presents a formula for calculating the sustainable value of a
company that, unfortunately, is of no use for comparing one company to another since it is not
a size-adjusted measure. All in all, our review of the existing tools for sustainable investment
decision making reveals a lack of disclosure of methods of calculation [except Hahn and Figge
(2011)] in those cases in which the measures allow for comparison of companies (for example,
the ratings by Sustainalytics).
One of the aims of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature and propose a sustainable
performance measure. In addition to taking into account the environmental and/or the social
52
Chapter 2 Finance for a sustainable world
aspects of the activity carried out, any such measure must use objective3 public data for its
calculations and make it feasible to draw comparisons between companies. We also propose a
second measure of the commitment-failure or non-persistence of companies in improving their
environmental and/or social performances. The objective is to learn whether the apparent
commitment of companies on sustainability issues is real or just coincidental. Finally, with
these two measures we propose a 2D graphical sustainability analysis which enables different
companies’ sustainability performances and levels of commitment to be compared, similarly to
what is done in a financial ‘mean-variance’ analysis, as Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2017) suggest
in their paper. The ultimate objective is to provide investors with a simple4, visual analysis
that can be understood by anyone, regardless of their knowledge of finance or sustainability.
Given that ‘a powerful driver of non-financial reporting is the investment community’ (United
Nations Global Compact, 2014), we expect the availability of tools that facilitate data analysis
to strengthen the already existing virtuous circle between the disclosure of data by companies
and their use in analysis by investors.
To show the implementation of our measures and analysis, we have applied them to real data
from the chemical sector. We have validated our measures and shown the usefulness of the 2D
graphical sustainability analysis.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section presents and discusses the
above-mentioned measures. The third section presents the data from the chemical sector that
are used in the implementation exercise presented in the fourth section. The last section presents
our conclusions.
2 Measures for sustainable investment decision making
This section presents the measures that we propose for a more complete company analysis: the
Relative Sustainable Performance Measure (RSPM) and the Measure of Commitment-failure
(MC). The ultimate aim of obtaining these measures is to present a two dimensional (2D)
graphical sustainability analysis that shows how well a company is performing in certain non-
economic issues and its commitment or lack of commitment to those issues.
2.1 Relative Sustainable Performance Measure (RSPM)
The Relative Sustainable Performance Measure provides an assessment of how well a company
is performing in environmental and social matters5 that makes it possible to draw comparisons
between companies. It is based on the profitability measure proposed by Hahn and Figge (2011),
i.e. the value contribution of the resource (VCR).
It is a measure that is calculated relative to the market, defined as the set of companies in
a specific industrial sector. First, it is hard to judge whether a company’s level of, for example,
3Taking into account Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2017)’s conclusions, we use data that show results of the strategies
the companies may implement.
4We also want it to be easy to compute, which is one of the main differences with the fuzzy multi-criterion
decision-making used by Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2017).
5Following the TBL approach, it takes into account the 3 pillars of sustainability.
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carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is high or low, but comparing its emissions with the emissions
of the market gives a clear idea about the company’s performance on that issue. Accordingly,
Hahn and Figge (2011) argue that environmental and social resources create value if they are
used by companies in a more efficient way than the average in the market. Second, it is clear
that comparisons only make sense for companies that belong to the same industrial sector.
The measure presented in Hahn and Figge (2011) is the following:
V CRCi,t = Profit
C
t −RUCi,t ∗REMarketi,t (2.1)
where V CRCi,t is the value contribution (to the profit) of resource i by company C in year t,
ProfitCt is the total returns of the company C in year t measured, in our case, as the EBIT in
millions of USD, RUCi,t is the use of resource i by company C, measured in the units required in











is the efficiency6 of use of resource i by
the market in year t, with N being the total number of companies.
The resources considered are not the conventional land, labour and capital but range from
CO2 emissions to total donations. They are considered as resources by Hahn and Figge (2011)
in the sense that they are things that the company can manage better or worse in carrying out
its activities. In the case of CO2 emissions, the company should try to obtain the same profit
with lower emissions, whereas in the case of total donations it should try to be able to donate
more.
Equation 2.1 shows that the profit of company C is corrected by the profit that company C
would have obtained if it had performed the same way as the market in the use of resource i
(measured as: RUCi,t∗REMarketi,t ). This gives the positive/negative excess profit that the company
has obtained (V CRCi,t > 0 / V CR
C
i,t < 0) by using a certain resource more/less efficiently than










From Equation 2.1, given the relative (to the market) nature of the VCR, it can be inferred









i,t 6= ProfitCt , where I is the total number of resources considered.
On the basis of this first approximation made by Hahn and Figge (2011), and because our aim
is to be able to compare different companies regardless of their size, we propose a modification





where RSPMCi,t is the relative sustainable performance measure of resource i of company C
in year t and TACt is the total assets of company C in year t.
The difference in the way in which the RSPM and the VCR rank different companies is
related to the spread of the TA. The bigger the spread the bigger the difference, and the higher
6Using Hahn and Figge (2011)’s terminology.
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the TA the bigger the change in the ranking for a single company7








The higher the total assets (TA) are, ceteris paribus, the smaller the RSPM is in absolute




when RSPM > 0). By contrast, when the RSPM is negative, higher TA make the RSPM less
negative, i.e. higher (
∂RSPMCi,t
∂TACt
> 0 when RSPM < 0).
Once the RSPMs are calculated for every resource considered, they can be grouped into
less specific resource combinations by working out an arithmetic average9 of the RSPMs to be
grouped. This gives an environmental RSPM, a social RSPM and a total RSPM, grouping the
environmental, social and total resources considered (although any combination is possible).
Moreover, for the ultimate objective of this paper, we calculate the time series average value
for each company for each resource and for the environmental, social and total RSPM during
the period analysed.
2.2 Measure of Commitment-failure (MC)
The Measure of Commitment-failure emerged from the idea that, since sustainability is a rela-
tively new matter for companies, investors could be interested in having a way to measure how
companies are performing environmentally and socially over time.
Like financial downside measures that only take into account the left (negative) side of the
distribution of the variable analysed [the downside risk presented in Sortino and Van Der Meer
(1991)], we propose a way to detect which companies have decreased their interest in these
matters over time. In particular, we need to separate upward and downward movements of the
RSPM over time and disregard upward movements, since they are not dangerous in this case.
Therefore, we propose a measure, the MC, that works like downside-risk measures and considers









where ACi,t = RSPM
C
i,t − RSPMCi,t−1, Z(ACi,t) is a function which is 1 if ACi,t < 0 and 0 if
ACi,t ≥ 0, T is the last year for which data are available and W is the total number of two
7For example, in the implementation in this paper, the largest company had the third worst VCR in 2009, but
had nine companies behind it in the RSPM that same year.
8Conceptually, the underlying logic is that when a company is larger (higher TA) a high (positive) VCR is less
praiseworthy than it would be for a smaller company (lower TA), since the larger company has easier access to,
for example, newer and less polluting technologies that can result in lower use of environmental resources. This is
supported by González-Benito and González-Benito (2006), who state that ‘large companies have more resource
availability’. It is this ease of access that also makes a low (negative) VCR less alarming in a bigger company
than in a smaller one, because it gives the company a greater ability to improve its performance in environmental,
social and economic terms.
9This average can be weighted either equally (as it is in this paper) or according to the investor’s preferences
[as Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2017) recommend], or indeed according to objective criteria such as the relative damage
(good) caused by the use of the different resources.
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consecutive year periods for which information is available to compute ACi,t.
The aim of only taking downward movements into account is that we seek to detect companies
that start neglecting environmental and social issues, whether their average performance is bad
or good, and punish them. Whether a company is a good or bad performer is already shown
by the RSPM measure. The MC measures something different and shows a positive value if a
company’s RSPM has decreased in any of the two-year sub-periods in the period analysed and
a level of 0 if its performance has remained constant or improved over the whole period. Thus,
the measure has a minimum value of 0, which corresponds to the ideal case of companies that
have a constant or improving performance over the whole period, and the higher the MC the
worse the trend in the company’s performance is over time.
The rationale of punishing a company that has been performing well and better for many
years but fails to improve or maintain its performance in one year is open to argument. Our
answer is that it makes sense for two reasons. On the one hand the company’s time series average
RSPM will stay positive anyway. On the other hand, if the downturn in the RSPM is relatively
small the MC will not be as big as the MC of a company that has had downward movements in
more periods.
Some readers may wonder if the MC in fact adds anything new to conventional standard
deviation. We want to emphasize that it is not the same as standard deviation because it only
takes downward movements into account and it does not take the mean as a reference. We
analyse this further later in this paper.
Last, it must be noted that this is a dynamic measure, so the MC of a company for a specific
resource or combination of resources is affected by changes in the efficiency both the company
and the market in the use of the resource(s) involved in the calculation.
The changes in the latter are not only a result of the change in the individual companies’
profits and use of the resources, but also of the way the market is defined. In our case, to
make the analysis as comprehensive as possible we define the complete market as the group of
companies in a sector that have reported data about the specific resource in the specific year
analysed, so the market may vary from one resource to another and its composition may change
over time either because companies enter or exit the market or because they start (or even stop)
reporting environmental and social data. As the last mentioned changes can distort realness,
they are unwanted. We expect these changes to diminish in the future with new legislation that
obliges companies to report environmental and social data so that only entries into and exits
from the market will change the market’s composition.
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3 Data
In this section we discuss data availability and sample selection criteria for the empirical imple-
mentation of our measures.
3.1 Sample selection
The data used in this study are taken from the ASSET4 database in Datastream. At the time of
our data collection in May 2015 there was yearly ESG information10 available about companies’
use of many resources from 2002 to 2014 for many sectors11. As not all sectors and years had
enough data for the set of companies in them to be considered as the market12, we chose a sector
that on the one hand is highly affected by environmental and social issues13 and on the other
has a large amount of published ESG data: the chemical sector. According to Datastream, the
chemical sector between 2009 and 2013 was made up of 127 companies14 from all around the
world.
Once the sector was chosen, we had to decide what ESG resources and years to include in
our study. The selection criteria relied heavily on representativity, which was calculated as











where TACt is the total assets of company C in year t and W
C
i,t is a function which is valued
at 1 if there are data available for the resource i for company C in year t and at 0 if there are
none, with N being the total number of companies in the sector according to Datastream.
For example, as can be seen in Table 2.1, the representativity of the resource ‘CO2 emissions’
in 2002 is 8.04%, meaning that CO2 emission data are available for a set of companies that
represents 8.04% of the total assets of the chemical sector (according to Datastream). The
sampling criterion was to choose those resources that had a representativity in excess of 40%
for more than one year, and the years in which the representativity level for all those resources
was higher than 30%. The average representativity in the sample is 60.5%, which we consider
representative enough.
As a result, the sample selected15 consists of the annual data available for 2009 to 2013 for
10https://uvalibraryfeb.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/asset4_esg_data_glossary_april2013.xlsx
11In May 2015, many companies had not yet reported their 2014 data.
12ESG reporting is not mandatory in all countries or for all companies, and in those where it is the dates
on which it became mandatory differ. For example, as stated in the Directive 2014/95/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014, in the European Union it will be mandatory from 2017.
13This is considered to be one of the most polluting industries (Xing and Kolstad, 2002) and, due to the
materials involved in its production processes, one of the industries where most labour risk prevention measures
must be taken.
14The list of companies includes, among others, Dow Chemical, LG Chem, Lotte Chemical, Hanwha Chemical,
Air Liquide, AzkoNobel, Mitshubishi Chemical, LyondellBasell and Formosa Plastics.
15It is noteworthy that the representativity percentages would probably be different (and result in a different
sample in terms of resources and years) in other sectors. For example, environmental issues may be less important
than social issues in the financial sector, so there would be higher representativity percentages for social resources
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the following resources, classified according to their nature:
1. Environmental resources:
(a) carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent emissions (CO2Em), measured in thousands of
tonnes
(b) mono-nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions (NOxEm), measured in tonnes
(c) mono-sulphur oxide (SOX) emissions (SOxEm), measured in tonnes
(d) volatile organic compound (V OC) emissions (VOCEm), measured in tonnes
(e) total waste (WasteTot), measured in thousands of tonnes
(f) hazardous waste (HazWaste), measured in thousands of tonnes
(g) total energy use (EnUseTot), measured in terajoules (TJ)
(h) water use (WaterUse)16, measured in cubic hectometres (hm3)
2. Social resources:
(a) injury rate (InjuryR)17, measured as the ratio of the total number of injuries and
fatalities including no-lost-time injuries relative to one million hours worked
(b) total donations (DonTot), measured in thousands of USD
The reader should note that total donations are a different kind of resource, because they
are not considered negative but positive for society, i.e. the more a company donates the
better it is for society. This means that, unlike all the other resources selected, it is good if
REC < REMarket. We have therefore introduced a sign change when calculating the total
donations RSPM, thus making a difference between resources that have positive and negative
impact on sustainability, as in Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2017).
Regarding representativity, the heterogeneity of the sample is evident in Table 2.1, as not all
companies report all data. Therefore, the number of observations, i.e. the number of companies
that have reported data for a specific resource in a specific year (out of the 127 possible companies
that comprise the worldwide chemical sector according to Datastream’s ASSET4 database) is
different for each resource in each year, as Table 2.2 shows18.
than for environmental ones.
16In this paper we consider that a lower level of water consumption is better than a higher one. However, we
are aware of the use of water as one of the least (if not the least) pollutant solvents in the chemical sector, so our
consideration of water use as a negative resource is open to argument. As our analysis is flexible in these matters,
each analyst or investor can change the sign of the variable (positive resource) or not take it into account at all
(neutral resource).
17Although TBL literature includes safety variables in the environmental section, we choose to consider them
a social resource, as done by Datastream ASSET4.
18Exceptionally, there are companies that report ESG values but not EBIT, which prevents their RSPMs from
being calculated.
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Table 2.2: Number of observations
This table shows the number of companies (out of a total of 127) that have provided data for the different
variables and years selected.
Year CO2Em NoxEm SoxEm VOCEm WasteTot HazWaste EnUseTot WaterUse InjuryR DonTot
2009 66 55 51 34 57 34 62 60 31 32
2010 78 57 56 38 65 35 74 69 43 39
2011 85 62 60 44 73 45 78 75 46 54
2012 89 62 61 44 78 48 86 80 51 58
2013 79 57 57 43 75 45 82 76 49 57
In addition, for each company and year we have also used data on the following economic
variables for our RSPM calculations:
1. earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT), measured in millions of USD
2. total assets (TA), measured in millions of USD
It is important to note that the data obtained are aggregate data for each company, regardless
of whether the company operates and uses resources in one country or more. Therefore, we are
unable to disaggregate the data in order to analyse resource use by country or continent, nor
can we analyse the effect of the different legislations that exist.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the resources used in the study. As a general
comment, the descriptives are stable throughout the period, with some exceptions that we
explain below. It is worth mentioning that the median is always lower than the mean, which
shows that the most extreme values are on the right-hand side of the distribution. This is
confirmed by the fact that the variables are all positively skewed and leptokurtic.
As Panel A shows, average CO2 equivalent emissions remained quite stable from 2009 to 2012
but in 2013 they doubled, due to Sumimoto Chemical more than quadrupling its emissions. As
the other descriptives show, this resource’s distribution has fatter tails than a normal distribution
(leptokurtic) and is positively skewed, which means that the extreme events are more extreme
on the right-hand side of the distribution (the high emission values). The facts that the median
is lower than the mean, and the standard deviation is double or more than double the mean,
as well as the minimum and maximum values, only confirm the description of the distribution
given above.
NOX emissions, shown in Panel B, have a similar distribution to CO2 equivalent emissions.
However, it is worth noting that there were no big changes in the former during the period
analysed and that NOX emissions are about one-thousandth of the CO2 equivalent emissions.
Moreover, the coefficients of variation are about double the values of the same statistic for CO2
equivalent emissions, which means that the tails are fatter. This is confirmed by a much higher
level of kurtosis.
As shown in Panel C, SOX emissions have a similar distribution to those of NOX .
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Table 2.3: Descriptives of the Resources year by year
This table shows the descriptive statistics of all the environmental and social resources used in this study, each
measured in its respective unit of measure as stated above.
Year






Panel A: CO2 emissions (CO2Em)
2009 (n=66) 5,373.06 2,337.50 19.80 71,322.00 10,222.88 1.90 4.63 28.42
2010 (n=78) 5,294.35 2,160.90 26.62 74,976.00 10,328.12 1.95 4.61 28.99
2011 (n=85) 5,061.68 1,844.87 26.81 74,778.00 9,988.64 1.97 4.74 30.70
2012 (n=89) 5,212.09 2,196.00 27.10 75,448.00 9,864.04 1.89 4.77 31.53
2013 (n=79) 10,600.67 2,340.00 27.21 412,400.00 47,039.39 4.44 8.17 70.06
Panel B: NOX emissions (NOxEm)
2009 (n=55) 6,224.79 1,363.00 7.00 160,000.00 21,628.89 3.47 6.72 48.20
2010 (n=57) 7,103.75 1,530.00 10.30 165,000.00 22,834.12 3.21 6.12 41.92
2011 (n=62) 6,572.40 1,544.00 10.20 155,000.00 21,036.07 3.20 6.11 42.13
2012 (n=62) 6,859.90 1,965.40 10.50 155,000.00 20,972.13 3.06 6.12 42.30
2013 (n=57) 6,007.37 1,683.60 7.70 158,000.00 20,916.65 3.48 6.91 50.69
Panel C: SOX emissions (SOxEm)
2009 (n=51) 7,277.93 730.00 0.70 233,000.00 32,549.61 4.47 6.73 47.18
2010 (n=56) 7,915.59 852.00 0.50 241,000.00 32,742.76 4.14 6.66 47.61
2011 (n=60) 6,897.28 519.00 0.29 208,000.00 27,637.17 4.01 6.67 48.47
2012 (n=61) 6,722.88 899.00 0.26 202,000.00 26,607.04 3.96 6.73 49.34
2013 (n=57) 6,059.67 494.00 0.15 215,000.00 28,455.88 4.70 7.13 52.84
Panel D: V OC emissions (VOCEm)
2009 (n=34) 3,418.72 767.00 64.80 47,000.00 8,164.55 2.39 4.68 25.39
2010 (n=38) 3,560.36 915.50 25.21 47,700.00 7,924.14 2.23 4.74 26.77
2011 (n=44) 3,200.57 918.00 22.47 46,500.00 7,180.57 2.24 5.17 31.51
2012 (n=44) 3,302.62 1,160.00 21.00 47,200.00 7,318.16 2.22 5.10 30.87
2013 (n=43) 3,327.73 1,049.00 2.00 47,500.00 7,437.71 2.24 5.06 30.38
Panel E: Total Waste (WasteTot)
2009 (n=57) 1,540.17 93.94 2.99 34,506.00 5,646.03 3.67 4.61 24.37
2010 (n=65) 1,093.07 71.92 2.02 29,089.50 4,507.19 4.12 5.39 31.29
2011 (n=73) 4,463.39 88.70 3.91 218,393.00 26,050.86 5.84 7.78 64.08
2012 (n=78) 4,460.50 84.43 3.05 246,129.06 28,225.92 6.33 8.22 70.72
2013 (n=75) 4,389.52 80.00 3.57 252,974.46 29,449.88 6.71 8.19 69.54
Panel F: Hazardous Waste (HazWaste)
2009 (n=34) 68.36 18.67 0.20 560.00 121.53 1.78 2.89 11.20
2010 (n=35) 112.99 28.05 0.20 1,199.00 231.47 2.05 3.46 15.57
2011 (n=45) 143.10 23.50 0.15 2,287.51 384.15 2.68 4.46 23.82
2012 (n=48) 131.29 20.16 0.10 2,284.42 369.22 2.81 4.73 26.44
2013 (n=45) 130.56 18.74 0.15 1,877.75 328.49 2.52 4.10 20.53
Panel G: Total Energy Use (EnUseTot)
2009 (n=62) 66,538.59 24,497.35 396.00 521,000.00 95,964.13 1.44 2.65 11.00
2010 (n=74) 69,610.01 24,737.71 530.00 590,600.00 105,103.96 1.51 2.67 11.21
2011 (n=78) 72,133.60 26,452.23 424.63 606,600.00 108,536.90 1.50 2.56 10.48
2012 (n=86) 72,889.40 30,600.00 452.26 592,900.00 107,042.87 1.47 2.47 9.84
2013 (n=82) 70,633.98 28,049.33 517.83 592,800.00 104,307.64 1.48 2.66 11.25
Panel H: Water Use (WaterUse)
2009 (n=60) 175.57 51.41 0.28 3,009.00 453.06 2.58 5.04 29.59
2010 (n=69) 155.18 42.26 0.39 2,693.00 378.38 2.44 5.11 32.27
2011 (n=75) 156.19 35.13 0.29 2,830.00 392.71 2.51 5.11 32.21
2012 (n=80) 160.81 38.61 0.30 2,770.00 378.03 2.35 4.91 31.39
2013 (n=76) 153.74 40.25 0.38 3,052.00 403.36 2.62 5.58 38.09
Panel I: Injury Rate (InjuryR)
2009 (n=31) 3.94 2.70 0.00 13.50 3.44 0.87 1.44 4.53
2010 (n=43) 3.49 2.70 0.00 14.15 3.23 0.92 1.46 5.13
2011 (n=46) 4.25 2.30 0.00 46.91 7.21 1.70 4.79 28.54
2012 (n=51) 3.97 2.48 0.00 38.33 5.77 1.46 4.41 26.35
2013 (n=49) 3.81 2.31 0.07 35.58 5.41 1.42 4.43 26.14
Panel J: Total Donations (DonTot)
2009 (n=32) 4,691.96 2,546.04 1.10 26,800.00 6,633.03 4.23 4.86 25.75
2010 (n=39) 4,261.18 2,152.07 1.40 40,060.00 7,288.51 3.51 4.44 23.44
2011 (n=54) 5,174.06 1,782.87 0.00 51,400.00 8,920.26 4.20 5.60 35.87
2012 (n=58) 5,364.80 1,626.47 0.00 50,550.00 10,029.00 5.63 7.03 51.68
2013 (n=57) 6,286.90 2,000.00 1.54 73,511.33 12,281.77 5.04 6.28 42.13
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Panel D shows that V OC emissions have a similar distribution to CO2 equivalent emissions
between 2009 and 2012. The minima in 2012 and especially in 2013 correspond to the company
Yara International, which seems to have made a real effort to improve its resource efficiency
over the whole 2009-2013 period.
As Panel E shows, average total waste reported by companies quadrupled from 2010 to 2011.
This is due, at least in part, to one company, MOSAIC, having approximately sextupled its total
waste from 2009 to 2011 (in 2010 it did not report any data for this variable).
Panel F shows two significant changes in the hazardous waste variable. One happens in the
period 2009-2010, when the mean of the variable nearly doubles. This is due to the company
Lyondellbasell Inds.Cl.A starting to report its data in 2010 and its value being 2010’s maximum.
In 2011 the maximum almost doubled again, when the company Incitec Pivot started providing
data on this variable.
Panel G shows that total energy use has the least leptokurtic distribution of all the resources
used in this study. However, it is positively skewed and leptokurtic, just as all the other variables
are.
Panel H shows that the distribution of water use looks similar to that of V OC emissions.
In Panel I some interesting facts about the injury rate variable can be seen. First of all,
the minimum is really low throughout the period. This means that those companies that have
fewer injuries relative to one million hours worked are close to or at zero, which is good news.
Secondly, a big increase in the maximum can be seen in 2010-2011. This is due to the company
K+S starting to report these data in 2011 and its figures being very high in comparison to those
reported by other companies in the years before. This made the distribution more positively
skewed and leptokurtic in 2011.
Total donations, shown in Panel J, show a steady increase, indicating that at least some
companies have become more socially aware (especially those that donate most: Dow Chemical,
the biggest company in the sample in terms of total assets in the first four years, although it
decreased its donations in 2013, and Sasol, which shows a steady increase culminating in the
maximum for 2013).
Table 2.4 shows the trend in the average EBIT of the chemical sector in the 2009-2013
period. There is a tendency towards EBIT growth, but some years are not as good as others.
One company, Lyondellbasell Inds.Cl.A, is worth mentioning since it started in 2009 and 2010
with the lowest value in the distribution and ended up in 2011 with the highest, with the latter
being much higher than any of the other maxima. This value made the distribution more
positively skewed and more leptokurtic.
Table 2.5 shows a steady increase in the average total assets of the companies. The maxima
in all the years of the period are those of Dow Chemical, the largest company in our sample.
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Table 2.4: Descriptives of Earnings before Interest and Taxes year by year
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the variable Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), which is
measured in millions of USD.
Year






2009 (n=122) 490.17 267.74 -5,411.81 4,942.40 981.02 2.00 0.01 18.17
2010 (n=123) 363.80 186.80 -2,620.84 2,995.90 664.67 1.83 0.92 9.28
2011 (n=125) 746.46 387.30 -4.15 10,434.17 1,127.78 1.51 5.55 45.30
2012 (n=125) 780.40 443.93 -40.47 4,863.12 866.66 1.11 2.09 7.82
2013 (n=125) 677.96 379.11 -1,574.22 4,648.76 903.60 1.33 2.09 8.54
Table 2.5: Descriptives of Total Assets year by year
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variable Total Assets (TA), which is measured in millions of
USD.
Year






2009 (n=122) 6,864.50 4,379.11 0.57 41,574.00 7,858.43 1.14 2.09 7.39
2010 (n=123) 7,116.85 4,200.30 2.54 63,898.00 8,805.62 1.24 3.12 16.83
2011 (n=125) 7,947.85 5,004.22 33.17 67,509.00 9,525.71 1.20 2.95 15.33
2012 (n=125) 8,448.89 5,426.06 37.26 66,665.00 9,596.75 1.14 2.79 14.06
2013 (n=125) 8,797.76 5,539.06 109.09 66,272.00 9,819.35 1.12 2.67 12.92
4 Results
This section presents the main results of applying the measures proposed to data for the com-
panies in the chemical sector worldwide.
4.1 Descriptives and analysis of the RSPM and the MC
With the variables presented in the previous section, we calculated the RSPM for each company,
year and resource (and for the environmental, social and total resources) and their associated
MCs.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 summarize the main statistical descriptive measures for the RSPM and
the MC, respectively, along with some other values, that we consider relevant in each case.
We analyse the RSPM first. To make it easier to interpret, we start by taking an example
from Table 2.6. The mean value of the RSPM which takes into account CO2 emissions is 0.0316.
This means that, on average19, each company in the sample obtained a profit that exceeded that
of the market by about 3% of their total assets due to their good management of CO2 emissions
in 2009-2013.
Table 2.6 shows that the mean is statistically zero for 6 out of 13 resources or combinations
of resources. The other values are positive for some environmental resources and negative for
social resources and their combination, and for the combination of all resources, at different
levels of significance. The fact that the total RSPM is negative (although only at the 10% level
of significance) is remarkable, and means that on average for the whole period and all companies
the profit obtained was lower than it would have been if they had performed the same way as the
19This is the cross-sectional mean of the time-series means calculated previously for each company.
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Chapter 2 Finance for a sustainable world
market due to the managing of the combination of all the resources considered. Specifically, if
they had performed the same way as the market, they would have obtained, on average, a profit
higher by an average of about 3% of their total assets (the mean of total RSPM is -0.0317).
Furthermore, it can be seen in Table 2.6 that the median RSPM (of the time series averages
calculated for each company) is positive for all environmental resources and their combination,
and negative for all social resources and their combination, which means that more and less
than 50% of the companies respectively obtained positive time-series average RSPM values. The
percentage of companies with a positive average RSPM confirms that more companies perform
better/worse than the market in the cases where the median is positive/negative. The percentage
of positive values (without making time-series averages for the companies) is also similar. These
facts show that most companies generally perform better in environmental matters than in
social matters, which may imply that the companies that made up the chemical sector between
2009 and 2013 were more aware of environmental concerns than of social concerns. It might
be thought that a high percentage of positive values means that the sector is performing fine,
and in a way it is, but the somewhat symmetric nature of the VCR, the measure on which the
RSPM is built, must not be forgotten. This means that the higher the percentage of positive
values is, the more probable it is that there are more companies that are performing really badly,
with extremely negative RSPM values. For example, NOx Emissions RSPM, with 76.19% of
positive values, has a very negative minimum (-4.4297) but the rest of the values are around
and especially just above 0. The maximum is 0.1855, very little in absolute terms compared to
the minimum. Last, the percentage of companies that have at least one positive RSPM value
during the period is really high for most of the resources or combinations of them. This means
that almost every company has performed better than the market at least once (though some do
not perform this way regularly, as the lower percentages of companies with an average positive
value show).
The trend over time in the RSPM for the combinations of environmental, social and all
resources over the years analysed is displayed in Figure 2.1, where each coloured line represents
a company. It can be seen that there is heterogeneity between companies and that although
there are positive values for some companies the most extreme values are negative20. This means
that some companies perform really badly in environmental and social issues, which should be
a reason for investors not to choose these companies in their investment portfolios. However,
most of the companies in question seem to have improved their performance by the end of the
period, which may also be a positive sign for investors.
Moreover, the most remarkable point in Figure 2.1 is that the RSPMs of many of the com-
panies remain quite stable over time. This can be seen more clearly in the next section, when
the MC is added to the analysis.
In order to validate our measure as something new, we need to demonstrate that it provides
information that is not included in the classic measures used in investment decision making. We
take the return on total assets (ROTA) as the classic economic measure with which to compare
the RSPM.
20It is evident that there are some companies for which we do not have data for all the years, as expected from
Table 2.2. This is especially evident in the most negative cases.
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Figure 2.1: Trend in RSPM over time
This graph shows the trend in the RSPM of the combination of the environmental resources, the combination of
the social resources and the combination of all the resources for each company from 2009 to 2013. Each line on
the graph corresponds to a company.


































Evolution of the RSPM of the environmental resources per company over time






























Evolution of the RSPM of the social resources per company over time




























Evolution of the RSPM of all the resources per company over time
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Accordingly, we conducted four analyses, one graphical and three analytical. For the graph-
ical analysis the total RSPM (rescaled for a better graphic representation) has been plotted
against the ROTA in Figure 2.2, both for time series averages per company and for all the
company-year observations. In both cases it can be seen that there are companies that perform
well financially (high ROTA) but not environmentally and socially (low RSPM) and vicev-
ersa. This evidence seems to confirm that our measure provides new information for investors
(although there are also companies that perform well or badly in both financial and environ-
mental/social issues).
Figure 2.2: Total RSPM vs. ROTA (Time series average and company-year observations)
This graph shows the Total RSPM plotted against the ROTA for both time series averages per company and all
company-year observations.






















Average Total RSPM vs. Average ROTA
















Total RSPM vs. ROTA
We prove this also by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient for the total RSPM
and ROTA, obtaining low values for both average and non-average data (0.1002 and 0.1915,
respectively). Although only the first is statistically equal to 0 (p-values for the 2-tailed test are
32.13% and 0% respectively), the value of the correlation is not high enough to make us reject
the idea that the RSPM is, indeed, a different measure from the ROTA.
In addition, we performed linear regression analysis through ordinary least squares (OLS) to
see if the ROTA was capable of explaining the different RSPMs calculated. The model tested
for each resource i or combination of resources is the following:
RSPMCi,t = αi + βi ∗ROTACt (2.5)
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Table 2.8 shows the main results obtained. We find that in 8 out of 13 cases they are closely
related, with significant betas (at the 5% confidence level). However, except in one case where
the adjusted R2 is nearly 60%, the figures do not exceed 40%, which makes us believe that the
RSPM is not only measuring what the ROTA measures.
Table 2.8: Results of the linear regressions RSPM vs. ROTA
This table shows the betas, their p-values and the adjusted R2 for the 13 regressions conducted. The model
tested is: RSPMCi,t = αi + βi ∗ROTACt .
Beta P -value Adj. R2
CO2Em 0.8742 0.00% 31.89%
NoxEm 0.7736 6.01% 0.88%
SoxEm 0.4585 20.96% 0.21%
VOCEm 0.6087 0.00% 8.17%
WasteTot -0.5150 11.11% 0.46%
HazWaste 0.7874 1.71% 2.38%
EnUseTot 0.9934 0.00% 39.60%
WaterUse 1.0972 0.00% 58.42%
InjuryR -0.0599 92.47% -0.47%
DonTot -0.5869 0.00% 10.00%
Environmental 0.7755 0.00% 11.82%
Social -0.3112 34.07% -0.03%
Total 0.4957 0.00% 3.46%
Last, we also calculated the Spearman correlation between the two variables, obtaining high
positive and negative21 values that are significantly different from zero and range from -0.5 to
0.84. This shows that the two measures do not rank the same way by definition, since if that
had been the case we would have expected to find similar coefficients of correlation between
the ROTA and the different implementations of the RSPM (different resources and resource
combinations). In fact, we confirmed this by looking at a selection of particular cases selected,
which can be seen in Table 2.9. As an example, it can be seen that there are companies such
as MOSAIC or DULUXGROUP that have two of the highest ROTA values of the sample but
have negative average Total RSPMs.
Altogether, we can confirm that RSPM and ROTA do not measure the same thing and that
the contribution of our measure RSPM is relevant.
Table 2.7 contains the descriptive statistics for the MC. 0.0195 is the mean of downward
movements of the companies’ CO2 Emission RSPM during the period (taking into account only
the years with RSPM data for each company). It can be seen that the median is low compared
to the maximum in all cases, which means that some values are far away from the majority (see
the maxima, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 and 2.6). The fact that the mean is always higher than the
median confirms this. The minima are zero in all cases, which is the theoretical minimum of the
measure. This shows that there are indeed companies that improve or, at least, do not worsen
their performance over time, which is good. However, the percentage of companies that show
such behaviour is low, for example 14% for the total MC, as can be seen in the last column
of the table. This shows that most companies are not really committed to environmental and
social issues. It is also worth noting that, although they generally perform worse in social issues,
chemical companies do not worsen their performance in social issues as much as in environmental
21It is noteworthy that the negative values correspond to total donations and the social factor grouping.
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Chapter 2 Finance for a sustainable world
issues (12.22% vs. 18.75% of zero-values).
In order to make sure that the MC is not the same as the standard deviation of the RSPM,
we again conducted four analyses: one graphical and three analytical. First of all, we plotted
the total MC against the standard deviation of the total RSPM (see Figure 2.3). As can be
seen, there is a positive link between the two variables when the MC is positive, but no clear
pattern exists for companies with an MC value of zero.
Figure 2.3: MC vs. Standard deviation
This graph shows the Total MC plotted against the standard deviation of the Total RSPM.
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MC vs. Standard deviation 
In our second analysis, we obtained high significant correlations between MCs for different
resources and resource combinations and the standard deviations of their corresponding RSPMs.
We attribute these high correlations to the low zero-value percentages, because not taking into
account (that is, not punishing) upward movements is the most distinctive part of our measure.
Since the percentage of companies with MC values of zero is really low, they do not offset the
highly correlated MCs and standard deviations of the badly performing companies . To prove
this, we calculated the correlation between the correlations calculated earlier (of which there
were 13, one for each resource or resource combination) and the percentage of MC values of
zero. The result was a value of -0.34, which means that the higher the percentage of ‘zero
values’ is, the bigger the difference is between the values of the standard deviation of the RSPM
and the MC. Although that correlation is not significantly different from zero (probably due to
the fact that only 13 data items were used to calculate it), we consider the result enough to
corroborate that the MC is not the same as the standard deviation of the RSPM.
Moreover, we used OLS to linearly regress the MCs for each resource and resource com-
bination against the standard deviations of the corresponding RSPMs, testing the following
cross-sectional model:
MCCi = αi + βi ∗ σ(RSPMCi ) (2.6)
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where σ(RSPMCi ) is the standard deviation of the time series of RSPM for resource or
combination of resources i of company C.
The results obtained (see Table 2.10) show that in 11 of the 13 cases the beta is statistically
significant. Furthermore, in most of the cases where the percentage of zero-values of the MC is
lower the adjusted R2 is much higher, almost explaining the whole MC in some cases. Therefore,
we continue to attribute the close relationship between the MC and the standard deviation of
the RSPM to the low percentage of companies with MC values equal to zero.
Table 2.10: Results of the linear regressions MC vs. σ(RSPM)
This table shows the betas, their p-values and the adjusted R2 for the 13 regressions conducted. The model
tested is: MCCi = αi + βi ∗ σ(RSPMCi ).
Beta P -value Adj. R2
CO2Em 0.5241 0.00% 84.81%
NoxEm 0.4789 0.00% 98.76%
SoxEm 0.4640 0.00% 98.10%
VOCEm 0.1815 0.07% 21.67%
WasteTot -0.0006 93.32% -1.34%
HazWaste 0.0632 5.70% 5.90%
EnUseTot 0.5134 0.00% 65.84%
WaterUse 0.2947 0.00% 42.07%
InjuryR 0.2327 0.00% 62.56%
DonTot 0.4563 0.00% 88.13%
Environmental 0.5154 0.00% 86.62%
Social 0.2887 0.00% 69.43%
Total 0.3324 0.00% 79.73%
Finally, we calculated the Spearman correlations between the two variables. Although they
are significantly different from zero (as expected), the coefficients are never higher than 0.72.
We can thus confirm that the rankings of companies that result from each of the two variables
are different.
In short, we have proven that the MC is not the same measure as the standard deviation of
the RSPM and that it is therefore a good contribution to the literature.
Finally, we sought to learn whether there was a relationship between the RSPM and the
MC. We calculated the Pearson correlation for the 13 resources or resource combinations and,
in most cases, obtained negative correlations significantly different from zero. This means that
in general those companies that perform better in the different categories presented are also
more committed to those issues.
4.2 2D graphical sustainability analysis
This section takes both measures proposed into account at the same time and presents the 2D22
graphical sustainability analysis: a tool for making sustainable investment decisions. By using
it investors can choose those companies that not only have positive RSPM values but also work
to maintain them or even make them better.
One really valuable aspect of this 2D graphical sustainability analysis is that investors can
22Referring to the two-dimensional nature of the graph and not to the number of sustainability pillars taken
into account: all three are covered, economic, social and environmental.
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apply it to whatever resource or set of resources23 they are concerned about or consider most
important, as RSPM and MC are calculated for each of them.
The 2D graphical analysis for the environmental (Figure 2.4) and social (Figure 2.5) resources
separately and for the above-mentioned different combinations (Figure 2.6) can all be seen. In
each graph we represent the MC on the x-axis and the time series average RSPM for each
company on the y-axis. Therefore, every point on a graph corresponds to a company. For the
sake of illustration we have selected some of the most representative companies (see Table 2.9)
and included three of them24 in the above-mentioned Figures. As mentioned in the previous
section, and although it is not very clear graphically, there is a general pattern: the better
(higher) the RSPM, the better (lower) the MC. However, there are also companies that have
better RSPM while having worse MC values and viceversa.
According to our analysis, investors should choose companies with high RSPM and low MC
(especially MC = 0) over those with lower RSPM and/or higher MC. Thus, preferences expand
to the top left part of the graph. However, the final investment decision will depend on the
investor’s specific concerns and his/her threshold of tolerance.
An examination of Table 2.9 and Figures 2.4-2.6 enables us to identify some companies that
are always (or almost always) preferable to investors, no matter what their particular concerns
may be. For example, Table 2.9 shows that LG CHEM is a better performer than URALKALI
in all the emissions analysed, because its RSPM is higher and its MC lower. This can also be
seen in Figure 2.6, for example, when comparing the performances of LG CHEM and MOSAIC
in relation to environmental resources, in which the former is clearly better than the latter.
However, there are other cases where the RSPM is higher but the MC is higher too (see Figure
2.5 for the graph of total donations). In these cases, for example when deciding whether to
invest in LG CHEM or CLARIANT based on their performance in total donations, investors
must decide whether they prefer a better-performing company or a company that is working on
improving its performance (or, at least, not neglecting it as much).
Whatever the investor’s specific concerns (and threshold of tolerance) for each individual
resource or combination of them, we believe that this 2D graphical sustainability analysis can
be a useful tool in investment decision making.
23It is important to note that in the resource combinations (Figure 2.6) some of the downward movements offset
upward ones in other resources, so the same company can have MC = 0 in an aggregate measure and MC > 0
for some of the individual resources of which it is composed. Therefore, if an investor is concerned, for example,
about environmental issues, especially NOx emissions, he/she should take into account both issues, analysing
the two different relevant 2D analyses, thus giving a solution to the fungibility problem of other sustainability
measures [Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2017) consider it very important to avoid this issue]. He/she could evaluate one
company using one analysis and, if it fulfils his/her expectations, go on to evaluate the company using the other
to see whether it performs in the range acceptable to him/her. The order of the analysis depends on his/her
priorities.
24LG CHEM, MOSAIC and CLARIANT, which have data for almost all the measures represented.
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Chapter 2 Finance for a sustainable world
Figure 2.5: 2D analysis for individual social resources
This figure shows the 2D analysis for social resources individually. Each point corresponds to a company.






















   CLARIANT
   LG CHEM
   MOSAIC






















   CLARIANT
   LG CHEM
   MOSAIC
5 Conclusions
In this paper we present two measures that enable sustainable investment decisions to be made,
following the TBL approach: the RSPM, which shows how well a company performs in environ-
mental and social matters; and the MC, which detects which companies have decreased their
interest in these matters. Both measures are very flexible and thus really useful, because they
can be calculated for different resources and resource combinations (in which the resources can
be weighted as desired in line with the investor’s preferences) and for different time frames.
This is a contribution to the sustainable investment literature, because to the best of our
knowledge no-one has presented measures with calculation formulas, and to date there have
been no dynamic measures such as the MC.
We also apply these measures to real public data on companies in the chemical sector and
validate them. In particular, we show that the RSPM is different from the ROTA and that
the MC is different from the standard deviation of the RSPM. It is noteworthy that both
the measures proposed are applicable to any industrial sector and that the relevant/selected
resources may be different in each one.
Moreover, we propose an intuitive 2D graphical analysis based on the two measures proposed.
This is a useful tool that can help investors make investment decisions: investors should choose
companies with high RSPM and low MC (especially MC = 0) over those with lower RSPM
and/or higher MC. It is useful both to investors seeking to maximize profits and to those more
concerned about non-economic issues, since it can be a supplement to or be supplemented by
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Figure 2.6: 2D analysis for grouped resources
This figure shows the 2D analysis for the grouped resources: environmental, social and total. Each point
corresponds to a company.
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well known economic and financial measures. In our opinion it would be very useful for the
databases that investors use in their analysis of companies (Datastream and Bloomberg, for
instance) to include our analysis, so that investors can also easily take into account the non-
financial performance of companies.
In addition, the measures and the 2D graphical sustainability analysis that we propose could
also be useful for policy makers during the regulation making process, helping to define limits in
the use of some resources, or even levying different taxes on companies depending, for example,
on whether and with what frequency they report, or on their RSPM and MC directly.
Finally, companies could also benefit from our measures, since they can be seen as a tool for
assessing their sustainability performance. Thus, companies can use the information that they
offer to manage and improve their efficiency in the use of a resource in their production process,
possibly selecting another similar company as a benchmark. Once the assessment has been
done, companies can apply tools to optimize their performance in managing the TBL, avoiding
the resistance of financial stakeholders, as in McWilliams et al. (2016). In fact, improving
sustainability can be transformed into a win-win situation, not necessarily sacrificing financial
outcomes (Beckmann et al., 2014) and making the company more profitable and more likely to
survive in the long run.
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Do Credit Ratings Take into Account the
Sustainability Performance of Companies?
Published in: Sustainability, Volume 10, Issue 11, article number 4272
1 Introduction
Since the publication of the Brundtland Commission’s definition of Sustainable Development
(SD), which states that ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED,
1987), concerns about it have increased. If society as a whole wants to achieve SD, different
measures have to be taken to redirect our world towards a sustainable path. This is why the
Sustainable Development Goals (UNDP, 2016) were drawn up. From them, disciplines such as
education for sustainable development (UNESCO, 2016) and Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) have grown, on the one hand to educate future citizens on the importance of SD and on
the other to get companies also to contribute to a sustainable future. In fact, as Hasan et al.
(2018) stated, there have been ‘increased demands of external stakeholders that hold companies
accountable for social and environmental issues’. Related with CSR, other concepts such as
‘corporate citizenship, sustainability, triple bottom line and social performance’ have often been
used as synonyms (Menz, 2010). In this study, we use the concept of sustainability in relation
to the above-mentioned definition of SD, which takes into account economic, environmental and
social issues.
Different performance measures have been proposed to assess whether companies carry out
their activities sustainably, as Poveda and Lipsett (2011) reviewed in their paper. Two of
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the most novel measures are the Relative Sustainable Performance Measure (RSPM) and the
Measure of Commitment-failure (MC) by Cubas-Dı́az and Mart́ınez Sedano (2018). The latter is,
to the best of our knowledge, the first measure of commitment, and we think it is very important
to consider this dimension of sustainability, because in order to really pursue SD, one has to be
committed to it. Both measures can easily be calculated with public data about quantitative
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) variables, thus being, in our opinion, more reliable
than measures calculated with qualitative variables. They are also highly flexible. For example,
if one is concerned about CO2 emissions, one can build up a measure that takes into account only
that issue (along with company earnings), but if one wants an environmental, social or overall
measure, one can also be calculated by following the above-mentioned proposal. This is a big
advantage compared to other measures such as KLD scores, which, due to their agglutinative
nature, make it difficult to identify firms that pursue value-destroying CSR practices (Gloßner,
2018).
In the last few decades, increasing numbers of scholars have examined the relationship be-
tween Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) or firm
value. They have found mixed results. For example, some authors such as Ameer and Othman
(2012) (in some sectors) and Cai et al. (2012), Cheung et al. (2013), Gregory et al. (2014), Jo
and Harjoto (2011), Li et al. (2016), Lourenço et al. (2012), Rodgers et al. (2013), Torugsa et al.
(2012), Waddock and Graves (1997) and Zanzana (2018) concluded that there was a positive
relationship between CSP and CFP, while Surroca et al. (2010) stated that there was no direct
relationship, but that the link was mediated by intangibles. The work in McWilliams and Siegel
(2000) and Soana (2011) (in the banking sector) found a neutral relationship between the two
performances. In contrast, Baird et al. (2012) concluded that the CSP-CFP relationship was
negative, and Menz (2010) found the same effect of CSR in the bond market. These mixed
results may be caused by the treatment of CSP as an overall score, as Perrini et al. (2011)
suggested. The work in Peng and Yang (2014) added evidence on the link between the two
constructs being weaker when ownership is more concentrated. The work in Alshammari (2015)
also found a moderating effect of ownership structure and corporate reputation. More recently,
Hasan et al. (2018) four that CSP affects Total Factor Productivity (TFP) positively and that
‘TFP mediates the CSP-CFP relationship’. The work in Li et al. (2018) also concluded that
even the disclosure of ESG information increases firm value.
Other authors such as Pae and Choi (2011) and La Rosa et al. (2018) have found that better
corporate governance and ethics/CSR decrease the cost of capital. Similarly, El Ghoul et al.
(2018) found that higher corporate environmental performance also reduces the cost of capital.
The work in Girerd-Potin et al. (2014) and Breuer et al. (2018) stated that the cost of equity is
lower for sustainably responsible firms, and Ye and Zhang (2011) found that there is an optimal
level of CSR, beyond which debt financing costs increase. In line with this last paper, Sun et al.
(2018) found a U-shaped relationship between CSR and shareholder value.
In a related line of literature, it has been found that announcements on good CSR have
no significant effect on shareholder wealth (Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012), but that illegal
behaviour reduces financial performance (Zeidan, 2013) and that the disclosure of environmental
violations sparks less reaction in China than elsewhere (Xu et al., 2012).
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The work in Hsu and Chen (2015), Jo and Na (2012) and Mishra and Modi (2013) stated
that positive CSR reduces the risk of companies, but Nguyen and Nguyen (2015) concluded that
CSR strengths and concerns both increase company risk. The work in Gloßner (2018) found
that ESG risks are not valued in stock markets, which leads to negative surprises when ESG
incidents occur.
Other researchers have analysed whether credit rating agencies take ESG issues into account
when determining credit ratings, e.g., Gupta and Sharma (2017) in their conceptual model.
Similarly, Birindelli et al. (2015) and Zeidan et al. (2015) created ethical ratings/sustainability
credit scores for banks.
According to Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (2014), a credit rating is an ‘opinion of the
general creditworthiness of a particular issuer [. . . ] based on relevant risk factors’. Thus, credit
ratings enable investors to make use of the expertise of rating agencies (Bereskin et al., 2015). As
Scalet and Kelly (2012) stated, the credit rating industry impacts very strongly on the financial
markets and governments of the world. The work in Kirchschläger (2017) also highlights its
power. Standard & Poor’s, as stated in Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (2014), analysed
both the financial and the business risk profiles of companies, which, according to Attig et al.
(2013), include CSR-related issues. They also took governance and other factors into account as
modifiers of their ratings. The work in Fitch Ratings, Inc. (2016) described the rating process,
including the information used to determine ratings: information related to the company and
information related to the market in which it operates, which could also include CSR information.
However, none of those documents issued by the rating agencies stated clearly that they took
into account sustainability issues when determining the credit ratings of the companies (neither
measured as qualitative, nor quantitative variables). Therefore, it becomes an empirical issue.
The work in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) found that
good governance is a positive driver of credit ratings, and Chang et al. (2017) stated that
‘trust underlies the corporate social responsibility (CSR) effects on long-term credit rating’.
In line with the concerns of these scholars, we believe that it is important to learn whether
sustainability measures are taken into account when these ratings are established, i.e., whether
the credit rating agencies are valuing sustainable behaviour by companies as a factor to increase
their creditworthiness, thus reducing their debt risk premiums (Menz, 2010). In the case of
corporate bond markets, Menz (2010) found that the effect of being socially responsible is non-
significant or just the opposite of what was expected. However, Attig et al. (2013) and Devalle
et al. (2017) found that rating agencies do indeed ‘collect and process CSR-related information
in assessing the companies’ creditworthiness’, so companies that get a better CSR score are more
likely to have a better rating. The work in Chang et al. (2017) stated that ‘CSR has a positive
effect on long-term credit rating and such effect varies with country- and firm-level trust’.
In our paper, we extend these earlier studies by using the measures introduced by Cubas-
Dı́az and Mart́ınez Sedano (2018) as the sustainability measures, due to their flexibility, their
completeness and the fact that they are calculated based on both financial and environmental
and/or social quantitative variables.
To the best of our knowledge, the sustainability performance of companies has traditionally
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been measured in terms of scores (usually combinations of binary variables). We propose to
use a more quantitative and reliable magnitude such as RSPM when analysing whether the
sustainability performance of companies affects their credit ratings.
Additionally, there have been no analyses of the drivers of credit ratings, which have included
a commitment measure. In our opinion, investors concerned with sustainability would appre-
ciate the consideration of the degree of commitment towards those issues in the credit ratings.
Therefore, we analyse if it has indeed been taken into account by rating agencies.
Thus, the aim of this paper is to assess whether a good sustainability performance increases
the creditworthiness of companies and whether not being committed to sustainability issues
decreases the ratings.
We estimate fixed-effects ordered probit models with Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings
as the dependent variable and RSPM or MC as explanatory variables in order to measure the
statistical effect of those sustainability measures on credit ratings.
Our analysis yields several key findings. First, quantitative sustainability performance mea-
sures such as RSPM have been taken into account to a lesser extent than more traditional ESG
scores. Second, commitment (failure) measures such as MC have not been taken into account
at all in establishing credit ratings.
The next section presents the data used in our estimations, including how the sample was
selected. In Section 3, we discuss our results, and Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2 Data
Here, we present the data used in this paper and their sources. We also include and briefly
analyse the descriptive statistics for each item.
It is important to note that, once all the variables were obtained and computed, we had an
unbalanced panel of 7365 observations representing 1008 companies from all over the world for
2008–2014 plus two additional years for credit ratings and control variables (2015 and 2016) to
enable us to estimate models with lags of sustainability performance and commitment measures.
2.1 Sustainability Performance Measures
First, we describe how RSPM and MC are calculated. The following definitions and formulas
are taken from Cubas-Dı́az and Mart́ınez Sedano (2018):
• RSPM is a measure that ‘shows how well a company performs in environmental and social





where RSPMCi,t is the Relative Sustainable Performance Measure of the resource i of
company C in year t, ProfitCt is the total returns of company C in year t measured as
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its EBIT in thousands of USD, RUCi,t is the Use of Resource i by company C, measured in











is the efficiency of use
of resource i by sector S in year t, with N being the total number of companies, and TACt
is the total assets of company C in year t in thousands of USD. We take the 10 Economic
Sectors from Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC).
• MC is a measure that ’detects which companies have decreased their interest in those
matters’. Since we are looking for MC time series, we calculate it for two-year periods
using the following formula:
MCCi =
∣∣ACi,t ∗ Z(ACi,t)∣∣ (3.2)
where ACi,t = RSPM
C
i,t − RSPMCi,t−1, Z(ACi,t) is a function, which is one if ACi,t < 0 and
zero if ACi,t ≥ 0.
The RSPMs for different resources can be grouped into RSPMs of resource combinations by
calculating the arithmetic average of the former. Consequently, the MCs for those combinations
can also be calculated.
In order to calculate both of these figures, we obtained yearly ESG data on the use of 45
resources from Datastream ASSET4 by Thomson Reuters (https://uvalibraryfeb.files.
wordpress.com/2013/09/asset4_esg_data_glossary_april2013.xlsx), and on Earnings Be-
fore Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and total assets (TA) from the Datastream Worldscope database
for 2002–2015.
We followed the procedure presented in Cubas-Dı́az and Mart́ınez Sedano (2018) and calcu-
lated the Representativityof each resource in each sector taking into account the amount of total
assetsrepresented in the sample. We selected the resources that had, for most sectors, a Repre-
sentativity in excess of 40% for more than one year and the years in which the representativity
levels for all those resources in all sectors was greater than 30%. In line with these criteria,
the period selected is 2008–2014, and the resources considered are carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions (CO2), Total Waste (WasteT), total Energy Use (EnU), Water Use (WaterU) and
total Donations (Don).
We computed the RSPM and the MC for these resources (RSPMCO2 and MCCO2, RSPMWasteT
and MCWasteT, RSPMEnU and MCEnU, RSPMWaterU and MCWaterU, and RSPMDon—the
only RSPM for which we changed the sign—and MCDon) and years, for the (equally weighted)
combinations of all the resources (RSPMcomb1 and MCcomb1) and for environmental resources
only, i.e., all except total donations (RSPMcomb2 and MCcomb2).
Since RSPM and, therefore, MC are calculated for the companies in each sector, we stan-
dardised the RSPM values for each sector and year. For MC, we rescaled the values according




where MCrsCi,t is the rescaled MC of resource i of company C in year t and max(MC
S
i,t) and
min(MCSi,t) are, respectively, the maximum and minimum of the MCs of resource i for all the
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companies in sector S in year t.
We chose to make the two variables comparable in different ways because of their natures.
RSPM is not bounded on either side; however, MC is bounded on the left side, and it is very
important to maintain the zero values, because they have the special meaning of a company
whose sustainability performance has not worsened over time. We therefore chose the classical
approach of standardising the RSPM, but not the MC, and decided to rescale the latter in a
way that maintained the zero values as they were.
Finally, some outlier observations were eliminated from the dataset using the following heuris-
tics presented in Verzani (2014), based on the boxplot function presented in Chambers et al.
(1983):
LowerLimit = Q1− k ∗ (Q3−Q1) (3.3)
and:
UpperLimit = Q3− k ∗ (Q3−Q1) (3.4)
where Qs is the s-th quartile and k a scalar (usually 1.5). In our case, we adjusted k to eliminate
the observations that were causing problems in the estimations.
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the various RSPMs calculated and standardised
year by year. The mean in all cases is close to zero, and the standard deviation is practically
one. The reason why the mean is not zero and the standard deviation is not one is that, for
the RSPMs to be more realistic, the standardisation was performed taking into account all the
RSPMs in the sample even if some of the values were not going to be included in the estimations
(and in the description of the variable) because they were from incomplete observations. In all
cases (except for RSPMDon, which always behaves oppositely to the other RSPMs), the absolute
value of the minimum is larger than the maximum. Since the median is higher than the mean
in all but one of the cases, this shows that most of the values are on the positive side. This
is reflected in the negative skewness coefficient. Moreover, the distributions are all leptokurtic,
which means that they are more peaked than a normal distribution and have heavier tails.
It is also noteworthy that the median decreases over time, accompanied by a decrease in the
minimum, while the maximum stays around similar levels. This shows that, as a whole, those
companies that were performing worst have worsened their performance, while those companies
that were performing best have remained at similar levels.
Table 3.2 shows the correlation coefficients between the different RSPMs. The correlations
between the four environmental RSPMs are moderate (between 0.26 and 0.67), showing that
companies that perform better for some environmental issues tend also to do well for other
environmental issues. Apart from that, both combinations are logically quite closely correlated
with their elements, with the correlations being higher than 0.41. The only exception is the
correlation of RSPMcomb1 with RSPMDon, which is 0.28. This is because RSPMDon behaves
differently from all the other individual RSPMs, as can be seen in the negative correlations
between RSPMDon and the four environmental RSPMs.
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the rescaled MCs. It can be seen that the
mean is closer to zero than to one in all cases and that the median is very close to zero or is
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actually zero in many cases, which shows that more than half the companies have not worsened
their sustainability performance over time. All this is reflected in the positive skewness of the
distributions, which are also leptokurtic. Moreover, it is worth noting that the mean of the
different MCs decreases from 2008–2014, which shows that companies became more committed
to environmental and social issues over the period, in spite of the drop in the median of the
RSPM.
Table 3.4 shows the correlation coefficients between the different MCs, revealing a pattern
very similar to that in Table 3.2. Some of the coefficients between the MCs of the combinations
and their elements are slightly lower and some slightly higher than the corresponding values for
the RSPMs, while the correlations between the individual environmental MCs are higher (show-
ing that companies that are more committed to some environmental issues are also committed
to other environmental issues).
Moreover, to enable us to compute robustness checks, we also obtained data on different
grouped ESG scores given by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 (henceforth ASSET4) to the compa-
nies selected (Environmental (EnvScoreA4), Social (SocScoreA4) and ESG ratings, which we call
“scores” (TotScoreA4)). We do not take the corporate governance score into account, as we do
not have any quantitative values for resources of that type. These scores have been traditionally
used to measure the sustainability performance of companies both by professionals and scholars.
The data are for 2008–2015 (one year more than we were reliably able to calculate for RSPMs
and MCs). We have not rescaled them in any way because they are comparable across sectors
as Thomson Reuters (2013) states. According to that publication, the total rating or score is
calculated by ASSET4 as the equally-weighted average of the environmental, social and gover-
nance ratings or scores, which, in turn have been calculated using so-called raw scores. Those
raw scores are computed from the different data points applying different values or calculations
depending on the nature of the data point (Boolean ‘yes/no’ or quantitative), weighting them
with the ‘Relative Level of Importance’ (defined in the document), and afterwards fitted to a
bell curve. Thus, the scores rank the different companies and have most of the values around
50 and very small values close to zero and to 100. The whole calculation process is described in
depth in Thomson Reuters (2013).
Table 3.5 shows the descriptive statistics for the above-mentioned scores. The mean and
median values are not very far apart and are both closer to the maximum (close to 100%) than
to the minimum (around 5–10%), and the median is always higher than the mean. This leads
to the distributions being slightly negatively skewed, with the left tail of the distribution being
longer and with more than half of the observation values being higher than 50%. It is also worth
mentioning that the mean and median increase over time, contrary to what happens with the
medians of the RSPMs, which is quite interesting. The fact that calculations for RSPMs also
include financial information makes the two measures different.
Table 3.6 shows that all three scores are closely correlated. It is particularly noteworthy
that the environmental and social scores are closely correlated, showing that most companies
that are performing well environmentally are also performing well socially according to ASSET4
scores.
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Table 3.1: Descriptions of the standardised RSPMs year by year.
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the environmental and social standardised RSPMs used in this
study, for 2008-2014.
Year






Panel A: CO2 RSPM (RSPMCO2)
2008 (n = 441) −0.011 0.199 −7.960 2.235 0.976 88.014 −2.477 15.266
2009 (n = 523) −0.007 0.175 −9.044 3.755 0.945 127.317 −2.203 20.376
2010 (n = 573) −0.001 0.180 −9.183 3.954 0.966 882.213 −2.556 20.312
2011 (n = 640) −0.012 0.158 −10.599 2.708 0.996 81.339 −3.639 28.886
2012 (n = 677) −0.029 0.160 −10.059 2.846 1.014 34.602 −2.973 21.501
2013 (n = 670) 0.005 0.130 −10.814 2.765 0.976 181.291 −3.805 31.779
2014 (n = 676) 0.009 0.106 −10.827 2.876 0.969 109.540 −3.816 33.563
Panel B: Waste Total RSPM (RSPMWasteT)
2008 (n = 302) 0.025 0.159 −6.781 2.289 0.958 38.398 −2.841 15.716
2009 (n = 335) 0.031 0.140 −4.786 2.744 0.903 28.693 −1.290 7.980
2010 (n = 380) 0.012 0.137 −7.943 2.318 0.984 79.981 −2.958 18.636
2011 (n = 418) 0.017 0.129 −8.703 2.485 0.991 58.234 −3.556 24.026
2012 (n = 443) 0.033 0.123 −8.928 2.300 0.923 28.204 −3.527 27.769
2013 (n = 470) 0.029 0.144 −8.083 3.904 0.937 32.793 −3.361 24.281
2014 (n = 501) 0.027 0.106 −9.899 3.756 0.911 33.261 −3.386 33.522
Panel C: Energy Use Total RSPM (RSPMEnU)
2008 (n = 374) −0.027 0.148 −8.493 1.853 0.986 36.682 −3.229 21.429
2009 (n = 423) 0.000 0.205 −7.853 2.738 0.967 5736.542 −2.974 20.633
2010 (n = 487) −0.021 0.145 −8.922 3.047 1.010 48.189 −3.852 26.890
2011 (n = 522) −0.029 0.145 −9.549 2.372 1.037 35.395 −4.152 28.121
2012 (n = 562) −0.016 0.141 −10.167 3.691 1.036 63.627 −4.867 37.436
2013 (n = 602) −0.017 0.137 −10.040 3.719 1.041 61.577 −4.088 31.099
2014 (n = 606) −0.013 0.141 −10.485 3.696 1.031 79.743 −4.786 36.161
Panel D: Water Use RSPM (RSPMWaterU)
2008 (n = 356) −0.027 0.270 −5.353 2.014 0.984 36.353 −2.389 10.779
2009 (n = 396) 0.005 0.202 −7.678 2.530 0.894 172.811 −2.849 20.041
2010 (n = 447) −0.016 0.120 −10.029 3.808 0.998 60.785 −5.793 50.875
2011 (n = 482) −0.016 0.149 −9.325 3.755 0.992 62.758 −3.757 30.710
2012 (n = 520) −0.007 0.113 −10.277 2.879 0.989 139.131 −4.159 37.165
2013 (n = 555) −0.011 0.137 −10.566 2.283 1.034 90.722 −4.631 36.145
2014 (n = 577) 0.008 0.121 −10.340 2.794 1.000 117.749 −3.127 28.034
Panel E: Donations Total RSPM (RSPMDon)
2008 (n = 360) 0.034 −0.218 −2.003 6.322 0.997 29.576 2.769 14.050
2009 (n = 402) 0.007 −0.103 −2.363 6.087 0.845 117.386 2.035 13.207
2010 (n = 449) 0.058 −0.143 −2.546 9.266 1.069 18.545 4.195 26.214
2011 (n = 479) 0.051 −0.115 −2.835 9.853 1.028 20.186 4.460 32.722
2012 (n = 535) 0.052 −0.117 −2.884 10.063 1.008 19.227 4.351 34.843
2013 (n = 580) 0.039 −0.126 −2.900 11.151 1.003 26.031 5.806 52.793
2014 (n = 589) 0.016 −0.130 −3.549 9.473 0.997 61.315 3.762 30.291
Panel F: RSPM of the combination of all resources (RSPMcomb1)
2008 (n = 544) −0.002 0.148 −7.796 6.657 1.036 511.456 −2.492 24.241
2009 (n = 610) 0.009 0.121 −7.755 3.816 0.908 96.494 −1.798 17.642
2010 (n = 669) 0.007 0.098 −13.035 7.669 1.057 152.527 −5.024 64.402
2011 (n = 718) −0.011 0.096 −13.533 6.088 1.061 98.911 −4.158 48.593
2012 (n = 779) −0.005 0.095 −14.305 10.281 1.024 210.071 −4.300 76.525
2013 (n = 807) 0.000 0.100 −14.554 8.615 1.018 2710.369 −5.191 74.259
2014 (n = 826) 0.012 0.093 −14.425 10.156 0.998 86.350 −4.033 78.975
Panel G: RSPM of the combination of only environmental resources (RSPMcomb2)
2008 (n = 480) −0.012 0.184 −7.195 2.464 1.002 82.539 −2.904 18.106
2009 (n = 556) 0.015 0.158 −6.961 3.119 0.911 59.730 −2.043 16.172
2010 (n = 618) −0.003 0.120 −11.388 3.857 1.018 371.750 −5.844 57.352
2011 (n = 676) −0.015 0.112 −12.124 2.814 1.038 71.576 −4.167 38.372
2012 (n = 723) −0.008 0.111 −12.694 2.856 1.029 129.181 −4.992 47.700
2013 (n = 729) 0.000 0.127 −12.670 2.812 1.023 40539.154 −5.380 49.778
2014 (n = 738) 0.010 0.109 −12.530 3.003 0.988 95.818 −5.581 54.883
88
Chapter 3 Finance for a sustainable world
Table 3.2: RSPM correlation matrix.
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the various RSPMs. ** and *** denote that the
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
RSPMcomb1 RSPMcomb2 RSPMCO2 RSPMWasteT RSPMEnU RSPMWaterU RSPMDon
RSPMcomb1 1
RSPMcomb2 0.835 *** 1
RSPMCO2 0.428 *** 0.540 *** 1
RSPMWasteT 0.652 *** 0.754 *** 0.473 *** 1
RSPMEnU 0.491 *** 0.694 *** 0.569 *** 0.263 *** 1
RSPMWaterU 0.413 *** 0.563 *** 0.664 *** 0.521 *** 0.398 *** 1
RSPMDon 0.280 *** −0.175 *** −0.125 ** −0.146 ** −0.242 *** −0.208 *** 1
2.2 Credit Ratings
We obtained the S&P long-term issuer credit ratings of the companies for 2008–2016 from
Bloomberg. The rating methodology for S&P is set out in Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services
(2014). Following the relevant literature (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Blume et al., 1998; Attig
et al., 2013, among others), we transformed the credit ratings into an ordinal scale, and we
assigned the following values:
• AAA+, AAA and AAA−: 9
• AA+, AA and AA−: 8
• A+, A and A−: 7
• BBB+, BBB and BBB−: 6
• BB+, BB and BB−: 5
• B+, B and B−: 4
• CCC+, CCC and CCC−: 3
• CC+, CC and CC−: 2
• DDD, DD and D: 1
Table 3.7 shows the number of S&P issuer ratings year by year. Most of the ratings are
between BB− and A+, CC being the one with the least values. Moreover, probably due to the
effects of the financial crisis, AA and AAA ratings decreased over the period analysed.
Additionally, to conduct robustness checks, we also obtained data on Fitch issuer credit
ratings for the same period from the Datastream ASSET4 database. The rating methodology
can be found in Fitch Ratings, Inc. (2016). The correlation between S&P and Fitch ratings is
0.825, which shows that the ratings given by the two companies are very similar.
Table 3.8 shows the number of Fitch issuer ratings per year. The distribution is very similar
to that for S&P, but the sample is considerably smaller.
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Table 3.3: Descriptions of the rescaled MCs year by year.
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the environmental and social rescaled MCs used in this study, for
2008-2014.






Panel A: CO2 MC (MCCO2)
2008 (n = 377) 0.086 0.001 0 1 0.198 2.287 3.283 13.904
2009 (n = 438) 0.105 0.005 0 1 0.201 1.920 2.735 10.711
2010 (n = 512) 0.081 0 0 1 0.193 2.391 3.035 11.872
2011 (n = 585) 0.078 0.000 0 1 0.177 2.261 3.525 16.389
2012 (n = 646) 0.076 0 0 1 0.175 2.320 3.333 15.137
2013 (n = 636) 0.080 0 0 1 0.176 2.200 3.335 15.143
2014 (n = 655) 0.062 0 0 1 0.158 2.538 4.027 20.893
Panel B: Waste Total MC (MCWasteT)
2008 (n = 251) 0.120 0 0 1 0.238 1.979 2.587 9.134
2009 (n = 290) 0.149 0.033 0 1 0.236 1.584 2.030 6.754
2010 (n = 331) 0.081 0 0 1 0.217 2.670 3.344 13.342
2011 (n = 377) 0.093 0.000 0 1 0.207 2.236 3.002 11.896
2012 (n = 415) 0.138 0.009 0 1 0.242 1.757 2.167 7.024
2013 (n = 437) 0.093 0 0 1 0.192 2.077 3.058 13.087
2014 (n = 464) 0.082 0 0 1 0.183 2.225 3.109 13.294
Panel C: Energy Use Total MC (MCEnU)
2008 (n = 309) 0.081 0.002 0 1 0.196 2.406 3.488 15.461
2009 (n = 362) 0.108 0.001 0 1 0.204 1.889 2.588 9.919
2010 (n = 423) 0.078 0 0 1 0.188 2.398 3.142 13.311
2011 (n = 484) 0.079 0.002 0 1 0.197 2.497 3.531 15.267
2012 (n = 520) 0.074 0.001 0 1 0.192 2.579 3.608 16.039
2013 (n = 559) 0.054 0 0 1 0.149 2.763 4.524 26.094
2014 (n = 588) 0.078 0.001 0 1 0.181 2.316 3.250 14.168
Panel D: Water Use MC (MCWaterU)
2008 (n = 303) 0.100 0.006 0 1 0.207 2.067 3.014 12.290
2009 (n = 345) 0.111 0 0 1 0.208 1.875 2.498 9.302
2010 (n = 387) 0.066 0 0 1 0.188 2.839 3.914 18.172
2011 (n = 447) 0.075 0 0 1 0.183 2.459 3.413 15.120
2012 (n = 484) 0.110 0.001 0 1 0.217 1.975 2.527 9.060
2013 (n = 514) 0.083 0 0 1 0.183 2.214 3.155 13.613
2014 (n = 548) 0.080 0 0 1 0.183 2.296 3.181 13.706
Panel E: Donations Total MC (MCDon)
2008 (n = 270) 0.094 0 0 1 0.216 2.305 3.195 12.863
2009 (n = 352) 0.095 0.008 0 1 0.199 2.097 3.050 12.474
2010 (n = 379) 0.091 0 0 1 0.200 2.185 3.080 12.677
2011 (n = 436) 0.077 0 0 1 0.195 2.540 3.400 14.628
2012 (n = 469) 0.094 0 0 1 0.203 2.166 2.791 10.570
2013 (n = 521) 0.050 0.003 0 1 0.148 2.932 5.145 31.439
2014 (n = 558) 0.068 0 0 1 0.178 2.615 3.805 18.027
Panel F: MC of the combination of all resources (MCcomb1)
2008 (n = 459) 0.072 0 0 1 0.193 2.663 3.531 15.504
2009 (n = 540) 0.081 0.001 0 1 0.181 2.228 3.301 14.712
2010 (n = 603) 0.039 0 0 1 0.148 3.768 5.031 29.160
2011 (n = 681) 0.063 0 0 1 0.155 2.475 3.731 18.690
2012 (n = 741) 0.041 0 0 1 0.125 3.071 5.320 35.826
2013 (n = 775) 0.041 0 0 1 0.128 3.156 5.602 38.536
2014 (n = 812) 0.043 0 0 1 0.138 3.183 5.220 32.945
Panel G: MC of the combination of only environmental resources (MCcomb2)
2008 (n = 413) 0.087 0.000 0 1 0.196 2.265 3.223 13.597
2009 (n = 476) 0.094 0 0 1 0.194 2.060 2.844 11.518
2010 (n = 551) 0.045 0 0 1 0.162 3.558 4.655 24.804
2011 (n = 629) 0.069 0 0 1 0.168 2.423 3.614 17.196
2012 (n = 690) 0.063 0 0 1 0.166 2.646 3.925 19.591
2013 (n = 696) 0.054 0 0 1 0.152 2.817 4.491 25.415
2014 (n = 722) 0.049 0 0 1 0.145 2.966 4.799 28.765
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Table 3.4: MC correlation matrix.
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the various MCs. *, ** and *** denote that the
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
MCcomb1 MCcomb2 MCCO2 MCWasteT MCEnU MCWaterU MCDon
MCcomb1 1
MCcomb2 0.930 *** 1
MCCO2 0.589 *** 0.657 *** 1
MCWasteT 0.532 *** 0.555 *** 0.664 *** 1
MCEnU 0.668 *** 0.734 *** 0.662 *** 0.604 *** 1
MCWaterU 0.608 *** 0.667 *** 0.659 *** 0.643 *** 0.699 *** 1
MCDon 0.102 * −0.108 * −0.125 ** −0.169 ** −0.125 * −0.109 * 1
Table 3.5: Descriptions of the ASSET4 scores year by year.
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the scores (environmental, social and total) given by ASSET4 used
in this study, for 2008–2015.






Panel A: Environmental Score (EnvScoreA4)
2008 (n = 151) 67.186 81.170 9.820 94.100 29.018 0.432 −0.872 2.232
2009 (n = 158) 67.489 80.380 10.090 94.410 28.698 0.425 −0.842 2.201
2010 (n = 163) 69.486 83.520 9.240 94.960 27.305 0.393 −0.962 2.490
2011 (n = 169) 70.438 82.090 9.130 94.650 25.619 0.364 −1.013 2.688
2012 (n = 178) 70.237 81.130 8.580 94.260 24.695 0.352 −0.987 2.722
2013 (n = 183) 71.073 81.300 8.740 94.360 24.393 0.343 −1.027 2.812
2014 (n = 189) 72.508 82.260 9.380 94.620 22.493 0.310 −1.036 2.969
2015 (n = 191) 77.987 86.360 12.690 95.050 19.767 0.253 −1.433 4.233
Panel B: Social Score (SocScoreA4)
2008 (n = 172) 69.263 77.965 3.930 97.810 26.675 0.385 −0.972 2.793
2009 (n = 183) 70.116 82.700 6.770 97.630 27.443 0.391 −0.926 2.550
2010 (n = 187) 71.512 82.650 6.330 97.420 26.083 0.365 −1.022 2.791
2011 (n = 195) 70.925 80.700 4.730 97.220 25.573 0.361 −1.007 2.812
2012 (n = 204) 70.041 81.610 4.920 96.960 26.245 0.375 −0.948 2.615
2013 (n = 212) 70.698 82.540 4.940 96.890 25.841 0.366 −0.987 2.770
2014 (n = 220) 71.359 82.750 5.000 96.780 24.685 0.346 −1.032 2.906
2015 (n = 221) 77.332 86.570 9.040 96.290 20.352 0.263 −1.400 4.063
Panel C: Total Score (TotScoreA4)
2008 (n = 167) 72.292 85.780 5.030 97.400 25.988 0.359 −1.000 2.757
2009 (n = 177) 72.132 83.790 5.150 97.440 26.949 0.374 −0.973 2.614
2010 (n = 181) 74.079 86.190 5.220 96.620 25.551 0.345 −1.170 3.120
2011 (n = 189) 73.649 85.510 4.410 96.420 25.312 0.344 −1.208 3.319
2012 (n = 198) 73.197 85.390 3.400 96.750 25.599 0.350 −1.136 3.075
2013 (n = 203) 74.028 85.030 4.700 96.680 24.986 0.338 −1.255 3.490
2014 (n = 210) 74.911 82.520 5.340 96.810 22.347 0.298 −1.318 3.982
2015 (n = 212) 80.288 86.600 11.160 96.070 17.757 0.221 −1.816 6.000
Table 3.6: ASSET4 score correlation matrix.
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the different scores given by ASSET4. *** denotes that
the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 0.1%, respectively.
TotScoreA4 EnvScoreA4 SocScoreA4
TotScoreA4 1
EnvScoreA4 0.837 *** 1
SocScoreA4 0.813 *** 0.738 *** 1
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Table 3.7: Standard & Poor’s ratings year by year.
This table shows the number of Standard & Poor’s issuer ratings year by year for 2008-2016. Ratings are
converted to an ordinal scale: 9 (AAA+, AAA and AAA-), 8 (AA+, AA and AA-), 7 (A+, A and A-), 6
(BBB+, BBB and BBB-), 5 (BB+, BB and BB-), 4 (B+, B and B-), 3 (CCC+, CCC and CCC-), 2 (CC+, CC
and CC-) and 1(DDD, DD and D).
Year S&P Ratings Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2008 1 0 0 18 121 340 243 85 6 814
2009 0 0 1 25 122 335 242 64 4 793
2010 0 0 0 27 125 346 251 57 4 810
2011 0 1 2 32 124 387 255 54 5 860
2012 1 1 3 33 126 419 247 47 5 882
2013 0 0 6 34 131 432 245 50 5 903
2014 0 0 5 44 143 423 264 51 5 935
2015 3 0 7 43 149 428 253 54 5 942
2016 1 1 13 46 153 418 244 54 3 933
Total 6 3 37 302 1194 3528 2244 516 42 7872
Table 3.8: Fitch ratings year by year.
This table shows the number of Fitch issuer ratings year by year for 2008-2016. Ratings are converted to an
ordinal scale: 9 (AAA+, AAA and AAA-), 8 (AA+, AA and AA-), 7 (A+, A and A-), 6 (BBB+, BBB and
BBB-), 5 (BB+, BB and BB-), 4 (B+, B and B-), 3 (CCC+, CCC and CCC-), 2 (CC+, CC and CC-) and
1(DDD, DD and D).
Year Fitch Ratings Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2008 1 0 1 9 48 165 161 81 4 470
2009 1 0 1 11 62 183 174 66 4 502
2010 1 0 1 14 70 210 180 62 4 542
2011 1 1 1 16 73 239 188 49 3 571
2012 2 1 2 16 78 266 179 45 2 591
2013 3 0 1 18 85 268 176 46 2 599
2014 3 0 1 18 82 270 175 43 2 594
2015 3 0 1 17 81 268 172 43 2 587
2016 3 0 1 15 64 242 155 40 2 522
Total 18 2 10 134 643 2111 1560 475 25 4978
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2.3 Control Variables
We control for a group of variables traditionally used in the literature analysing the drivers of
credit ratings (Attig et al., 2013; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Blume et al., 1998, among others),
namely:
• CAPINT: ratio of property, plant and equipment (PPE) or Fixed Assets to TA
• COVERAGE: ratio of EBIT plus interest expense to interest expense
• LEVERAGE: ratio of long-term debt to TA
• LOSS: a variable that takes a value of one if the company had a negative net income before
extraordinary items in the current year and the previous one and zero if not
• MARGIN: ratio of operating income to sales
• SIZE: natural logarithm of TA. As Dang et al. (2018) stated, SIZE is a fundamental
variable when doing research on empirical corporate finance, and as it can be measured
in different ways, the selection of one measure over others has to be justified. In our
case, we use the natural logarithm of TA, because it is less related to the market than
market capitalizationand also to firm performance, because that is what the sustainability
measures already included in the estimations deal with, especially RSPM. On top of that,
the natural logarithm of TA is the most commonly-used SIZE measure in the literature
that analyses the drivers of credit ratings.
• STD: Standard Deviation of the yearly returns on investment in the company, taking
seven-year moving windows
We obtained the yearly data needed to calculate the above-mentioned controls for 2008–2016
from the Datastream Worldscope database.
Table 3.9 shows the descriptions of the control variables for the whole sample (including 2015
and 2016). The means of CAPINT and LEVERAGE are about 1/3 and 1/5, respectively, of the
TA, showing that the companies included in the sample have, on average, less fixed assets than
current assets and more short-term debt and equity than long-term debt. For COVERAGE and
MARGIN, the means are positive. However, in the case of COVERAGE, the mean is much
closer to the minimum than to the maximum, which makes the distribution highly positively
skewed. For MARGIN, the opposite is true. LOSS is an indicator variable, so its value is either
zero or one. Since its mean is very close to zero, most of the companies in the sample did
not have negative net income before extraordinary items for two years in a row in the period
analysed. Moreover, it can be deduced from the SIZE variable that the average total assets of
the companies in the sample is 24,079.03 millions of USD, going from 54.38 millions of USD to
4,766,630.16 millions of USD, thus covering a wide range of company sizes. Finally, STD is quite
small for all the companies and years, but there are some higher values as is the maximum.
Table 3.10 shows the correlation coefficients between the control variables and RSPMcomb2,
MCcomb2 and TotScoreA4. The correlations between the control variables are quite low, except
for CAPINT and LEVERAGE, which is 0.429. This helps avoid multicollinearity.
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Table 3.9: Descriptions for the control variables.
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables used in the model estimation for the whole
period 2008-2016.






CAPINT (n = 7365) 0.335 0.287 0 0.984 0.274 0.819 0.448 1.997
COVERAGE (n = 7365) 39.676 5.958 −1511.575 140,633.500 1646.577 41.500 84.577 7219.264
LEVERAGE (n = 7365) 0.224 0.209 0 0.870 0.142 0.633 0.644 3.233
LOSS (n = 7365) 0.051 0 0 1 0.220 4.306 4.073 17.590
MARGIN (n = 7365) 0.054 0.125 −188.687 10.483 3.368 62.165 −41.913 1958.038
SIZE (n = 7365) 16.997 16.852 10.904 22.285 1.481 0.087 0.591 3.412
STD (n = 7365) 0.379 0.313 0.042 4.953 0.281 0.742 4.191 41.617
Table 3.10: Control variable correlation matrix.
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the control variables and one of the RSPMs and one of
the MCs used in the model estimation. *, ** and *** denote that the coefficients are significantly different from
zero at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
RSPMcomb2 MCcomb2 TotScoreA4 CAPINT COVERAGE LEVERAGE LOSS MARGIN SIZE STD
RSPMcomb2 1
MCcomb2 −0.442 *** 1
TotScoreA4 0.100 0.0260 1
CAPINT −0.113 ** 0.0836 * −0.114 ** 1
COVERAGE 0.194 *** −0.161 *** 0.0346 −0.0229 1
LEVERAGE −0.0521 0.0408 −0.198 *** 0.429 *** −0.159 *** 1
LOSS −0.179 *** 0.00881 −0.167 *** 0.127 *** −0.0489 * 0.175 *** 1
MARGIN 0.0700 −0.109 ** 0.0902 * 0.0430 * 0.00787 0.0454 * −0.0254 1
SIZE 0.115 ** −0.148 *** 0.276 *** −0.290 *** 0.0117 −0.313 *** −0.116 *** 0.0449 * 1
STD −0.0794 * 0.0702 −0.249 *** −0.0182 −0.0444 * 0.0163 0.109 *** −0.0205 −0.186 *** 1
Moreover, the correlation coefficients between RSPMcomb2 and TotScoreA4, and MCcomb2
and TotScoreA4 are not significantly different from zero, which shows that RSPMcomb2 and
MCcomb2 are not at all related to TotScoreA4. Once again, it can be seen that the use of
novel measures, that are not as known as the scores by ASSET4, such as RSPM and MC, can
improve our knowledge of the relationship between credit ratings and sustainability performance
and commitment. In fact, we think that the quantitative nature of the data used to calculate it
makes RSPM a better proxy of sustainability performance and that MC adds information that
is essential to assess it: the commitment of the companies towards sustainability.
Finally, the correlation between RSPMcomb2 and MCcomb2 is significantly negative, which
shows that companies that perform better in environmental and social issues are also more
committed to them.
3 Results
This section presents the results of our estimation of fixed-effects ordered probit panel regres-
sions, clustering robust standard errors by company and including economic sector and year
dummies. We used an ordered probit model, because our dependent variable is categorical and
ordered.
The models that we estimate in this section follow this equation:
RatingCt = βSM ∗SMCt−k+βCV ∗CV Ct−1+βS ∗SectordummiesC +βY ∗Y eardummiest+εCt (3.5)
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where Rating is the credit rating, C identifies the companies, t is the number of observations in
each cluster (years), k is the number of lags, SM is the sustainability measure included in most
of the models (RSPMs, MCs or the scores from ASSET4), CV are the seven control variables
presented above, Sectordummies represents the nine dummies for the different sectors (exclud-
ing one used as reference), Y eardummies are the dummies for the different years (excluding
always one used as reference) and ε stands for errors. In order to avoid multicollinearity, we
only include one sustainability measure in each model estimated.
Note that, in order to mitigate a possible endogeneity problem and following Li (2016), we
have included the remedies proposed in that paper that best suit our case:
• Lagged independent variables: to alleviate the simultaneity problem and to be able to
claim causality of the potentially found relationships between sustainability measures and
credit ratings
• Firm and sector fixed effects: to ensure that time-invariant firm and sector characteristics
are not absorbed by the error term
• Year fixed effects: to capture the effect that economic conditions and other market shocks
may have on both credit ratings and sustainability performance
• Control variables: to ensure that time-variant firm characteristics are not captured by the
error term
3.1 Main Models
We have estimated the model specified in Equation (3.5), where RSPM is the sustainability
measure. We included none or one of the RSPMs, either the one- or two-year lag. In principle,
we found it more logical to include the one-year lag, because, as we have realised, the values
of the quantitative variables used to calculate the RSPMs were usually available the next year.
After analysing the results of both options, we concluded that the best method is to use the
one-year lag in the estimations, because the results were more sensible, and this is consistent
with our initial thoughts, with the estimation period thus being 2009–2015. Those results are
included in Table 3.11. We use the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 as the goodness of fit
measure. It modifies McFadden’s pseudo-R2 presented in McFadden (1974), taking into account
the number of covariates in each estimation. It is important to note that the unbalanced nature
of the data panel caused the number of observations to be different for each model, so to ensure
comparability, we included the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 for both the model estimated
and the model without RSPM for the different subsamples used in each case.
It can be seen that the results for the control variables were quite consistent with the prior
literature: for example, LEVERAGE, LOSS and STD had a negative relationship with credit
ratings, as shown by their significantly negative coefficients. The only difference is that the co-
efficient of the variable MARGIN is significantly negative in more than one case. We found that
all of the environmental RSPMs have significantly positive coefficients, which shows that compa-
nies that perform better environmentally tend to receive higher credit ratings. The coefficient of
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RSPMDon was not significant. However, the coefficient being negative is interesting and led us
to think that donationswere not considered good in the credit rating industry, probably because
they reduced net profit. RSPMcomb2, the RSPM of the combination of all the environmental
resources, was the only combination that had a significant coefficient.
The adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 was quite high. [McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is usually much
lower than the traditional R2, and values of 0.2–0.4 ’represent an excellent fit’ (McFadden, 1978)].
in all of the models, and as revealed by the significance of the coefficients, the pseudo-R2 of the
estimations increased most in relative terms with respect to the model with only the controls in
the models with RSPMCO2 and RSPMWaterU, especially in the former (6.41% vs. 4.26%).
Next, we estimated the same models for the different MCs. In this case, the best models
were those with the two-year lag. Therefore, the estimation period was 2010–2016. Since MC
measures commitment-failure over time, it should take longer to affect the determination of
credit ratings.
Table 3.12 shows the results of the different estimations. The results for the control variables
are consistent with the prior literature. The coefficients for the MCs were negative in all cases,
because the MC became worse the higher it was. However, none had significant coefficients.
As for the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2, only the models with MCEnU and MCDon
increased their values in comparison with the models with only the control variables. This shows
that in all the cases, but the two mentioned, including MCs did not increase the explanatory
capability of the models. Thus, sustainability commitment (or non-commitment) measures of
this type seem not to be considered by credit rating agencies, though our opinion is that they
should be.
3.2 Robustness Checks
To ensure the reliability of our previous results, this section presents four alternative robustness
checks: breaking down the sample into sub-periods, estimating the models by sector, using Fitch
ratings instead of S&P ratings as the dependent variable and using ASSET4 scores instead of
the RSPM as the sustainability performance measure. In all cases, we present the results of only
some of the estimations, but the remaining results are available from the authors upon request.
Sample Break-Down
First, we divided the sample into two and four periods of time. Remember that the dates go
from 2009–2015 for RSPM and from 2010–2016 for MC.
Table 3.13 presents the results for RSPMcomb2, where, surprisingly, a decreasing pattern
of the influence of the RSPMs on S&P ratings is shown. It was in the earliest periods that
the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 increased the most with respect to the models without the
RSPMs. Similar findings were obtained for alternative RSPM measures, RSPMCO2 having the
most persistent effect.
We also estimated the models for all of the MCs in different time frames, and the results
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Table 3.13: Models with RSPMcomb2Lag1 for different time frames.
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the combination of the
environmental RSPMs and all the controls for different time frames. In all models industry and year effects are
taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included in the table). * and ** denote that the
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
2009–2012 2013–2015 2009–2010 2011–2012 2013–2014 2015
RatingSP RSPMcomb2Lag1 0.152 0.071 0.235 0.093 0.076 0.060
(2.82) ** (1.57) (3.70) ** (1.49) (1.56) (1.11)
CAPINTLag1 0.922 0.573 1.184 0.729 0.470 0.745
(4.22) ** (2.96) ** (4.43) ** (3.13) ** (2.26) * (3.45) **
COVERAGELag1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
(2.46) * (3.49) ** (1.20) (1.12) (2.84) ** (3.04) **
LEVERAGELag1 −2.501 −1.838 −2.800 −2.316 −1.945 −1.672
(6.69) ** (5.18) ** (6.32) ** (5.59) ** (5.00) ** (4.21) **
LOSSLag1 −0.924 −1.373 −1.169 −0.757 −1.417 −1.349
(4.77) ** (9.21) ** (4.24) ** (3.26) ** (7.89) ** (6.87) **
MARGINLag1 −0.008 −0.004 0.162 −0.007 −0.003 −0.005
(1.31) (2.49) * (0.57) (1.33) (2.19) * (2.54) *
SIZELag1 0.340 0.353 0.362 0.335 0.382 0.307
(11.01) ** (11.65) ** (9.76) ** (10.13) ** (11.91) ** (8.99) **
STDLag1 −1.877 −1.260 −2.402 −1.619 −1.377 −1.119
(8.25) ** (4.37) ** (7.84) ** (6.59) ** (5.07) ** (3.34) **
N 2183 2045 966 1217 1354 691
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1904 0.1949 0.2175 0.1676 0.2071 0.1626
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without RSPM 0.1846 0.1939 0.2060 0.1659 0.2060 0.1627
were also consistent: we found that no MC is significant in any time frame, as can be seen in
Table 3.14 for the case of MCcomb2.
By Sectors
To learn whether sustainability performance is more significant in some sectors than others, we
estimated the model by sectors and obtained some interesting results. Although not shown here,
we found that RSPMcomb1 had no effect in any sector, and that RSPMcomb2 was only taken
into account in the Basic Materialssector, which includes Chemicalsamong others. The results
for RSPMDon are also interesting: it was considered positive in the Energysector, but negative
in Basic Materials, Industrial Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goodsand Utilities. Moreover, the
results for Financialsshow that none of the RSPMs had a significant effect on the credit ratings
of companies in that sector.
Finally, we found that RSPMCO2 was one of the two (together with RSPMWasteT) that
had the most influence on ratings, possibly because of the visibility of CO2 emissions. We show
these results in Table 3.15. It can be seen that RSPMCO2 has a significantly positive coefficient
in four out of the 10 sectors; surprisingly, Telecommunication Serviceswas one of them.
The adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 was found to vary from sector to sector, being very
high in some, such as Healthcareand Telecommunication Services, and very low in others, such
as the Cyclical Consumer Goodsand Utilitysectors. Moreover, it can be seen that when the
RSPMCO2 is included in the models, the pseudo-R2 is greater than in the model without it in
all cases except for the Financial sector. It increases especially in the Utility, Telecommunication
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Table 3.14: Models with MCcomb2Lag2 for different time frames.
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the MC of the
combination of the environmental RSPMs and all the controls for different time frames.In all models industry
and year effects are taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included in the table). * and **
denote that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
2010–2013 2014–2016 2010–2011 2012–2013 2014–2015 2016
RatingSP MCcomb2Lag2 −0.023 −0.056 0.126 −0.211 −0.163 0.199
(0.18) (0.35) (0.71) (0.98) (0.81) (0.81)
CAPINTLag1 0.762 0.526 0.864 0.616 0.534 0.545
(3.40) ** (2.81) ** (3.07) ** (2.72) ** (2.67) ** (2.78) **
COVERAGELag1 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.48) (3.29) ** (1.19) (2.09) * (3.78) ** (2.65) **
LEVERAGELag1 −2.673 −1.509 −2.819 −2.377 −1.696 −1.295
(6.82) ** (4.38) ** (5.37) ** (5.73) ** (4.48) ** (3.56) **
LOSSLag1 −1.096 −1.323 −0.917 −1.277 −1.393 −1.221
(6.80) ** (11.38) ** (3.78) ** (6.19) ** (9.16) ** (6.61) **
MARGINLag1 −0.003 0.002 0.172 −0.003 −0.003 0.008
(1.52) (0.70) (0.98) (2.08) * (1.44) (3.77) **
SIZELag1 0.333 0.326 0.316 0.357 0.342 0.299
(10.27) ** (10.53) ** (7.83) ** (10.58) ** (10.75) ** (8.83) **
STDLag1 −1.803 −1.832 −2.068 −1.670 −1.934 −1.700
(8.21) ** (8.06) ** (6.82) ** (7.99) ** (8.45) ** (6.21) **
N 1988 2009 846 1142 1329 680
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1852 0.1929 0.1725 0.1899 0.1976 0.1711
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without MC 0.1856 0.1933 0.1732 0.1903 0.1979 0.1719
Services and Basic Materials sectors.
In the case of MC (not shown in the tables), almost all coefficients were found not to be
significantly different from zero, and there was hardly any difference from one sector to another.
There were three exceptions for different MCs in different sectors that we did not consider
relevant. However, in those cases, the sign of the coefficient was negative, which is the right
direction.
Fitch Ratings
To test whether the positive influence of the RSPM and lack of influence of the MC are also
found in ratings from other credit rating agencies, we estimated the main models presented
above using Fitch credit ratings instead of S&P ratings as the dependent variable. Surprisingly,
we found that most RSPMs did not have significant coefficients (only RSPMcomb2, RSPMEnU
and RSPMWaterU did). Since the number of observations was smaller for Fitch than for S&P
ratings, we estimated the models with the reduced sample of observations that had values
for both ratings, and we found similar results. We therefore concluded that this subsample
showed less influence from sustainability performance measures. Moreover, none of the MCs
have significant coefficients, as occurred with the S&P ratings.
Table 3.16 presents the results for the combination of the environmental resources. As with
the S&P ratings’ models, RSPMcomb2 was significantly positive at a 5% level, while MCcomb2
was not. This is also reflected in the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2: for the RSPM model, it
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increased with respect to the model with only the control variables, and for the MC model it
decreased.
Table 3.16: Models with Fitch rating.
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation of one of the models presented
above with the rating by Fitch instead of S&P as the dependent variable. In all models industry and year effects
are taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included in the table). * and ** denote that the





CAPINTLag1 0.682 0.906 0.644
(3.11) ** (3.38) ** (2.29) *
COVERAGELag1 −0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.44) (1.24) (3.15) **
LEVERAGELag1 −1.648 −2.013 −1.511
(4.38) ** (4.79) ** (3.60) **
LOSSLag1 −0.430 −0.450 −0.436
(3.02) ** (2.71) ** (2.73) **
MARGINLag1 1.433 1.457 1.804
(4.38) ** (3.83) ** (4.56) **
SIZELag1 0.448 0.433 0.448
(12.60) ** (11.45) ** (11.25) **
STDLag1 −1.255 −1.370 −1.499
(5.25) ** (4.71) ** (5.83) **
N 4052 3014 2803
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1910 0.2027 0.2038
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without RSPM or MC 0.1910 0.2003 0.2040
ASSET4 Scores
Finally, we also wanted to know whether scores frequently used in the literature to assess sus-
tainability were considered when establishing the credit ratings of companies. To that end, we
included the sustainability performance measures by ASSET4 presented in the Data section.
Table 3.17 presents the results of our estimations. The coefficients of all three scores from
ASSET4 were significantly positive, and they all improved on the model with only the control
variables. We also estimated the model with TotScoreA4 with the reduced sample using the
observations that included values for both TotScoreA4 and RSPMcomb2 (and also EnvScoreA4
and RSPMCO2). We found, on the one hand, similar adjusted McFadden pseudo-R2 values and,
on the other hand, less significance for the RSPMs, showing that the more popular ASSET4
scores were taken into account more than measures such as the RSPM when determining the
credit ratings of companies.
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Table 3.17: Models with ASSET4 scores.
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the different scores from
ASSET4 and all the controls.In all models industry and year effects are taken into account with industry and
year dummies (not included in the table). * and ** denote that the coefficients are significantly different from







CAPINTLag1 0.572 0.645 0.513 0.713
(3.71) ** (2.45) * (1.88) (2.78) **
COVERAGELag1 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.37) (3.63) ** (3.80) ** (3.63) **
LEVERAGELag1 −1.971 −2.447 −2.169 −2.437
(6.91) ** (5.14) ** (4.39) ** (5.24) **
LOSSLag1 −1.201 −1.088 −1.081 −1.184
(12.17) ** (6.14) ** (5.86) ** (6.58) **
MARGINLag1 −0.001 1.203 1.209 1.180
(0.29) (2.58) ** (2.60) ** (2.65) **
SIZELag1 0.356 0.348 0.348 0.335
(13.79) ** (7.36) ** (7.37) ** (7.08) **
STDLag1 −1.445 −2.218 −2.449 −2.333
(8.94) ** (7.94) ** (7.80) ** (8.46) **
N 6006 2065 1922 2137
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1814 0.2561 0.2515 0.2582
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without ASSET4 Score 0.1814 0.2501 0.2444 0.2518
4 Discussion
This paper checks whether the novel sustainability performance and commitment measures
presented by Cubas-Dı́az and Mart́ınez Sedano (2018) (namely, RSPM and MC ) are taken
into account in the real world, in the special case of credit ratings. We conducted fixed-effects
ordered probit model estimations with robust standard errors clustered by company and included
economic sector and year dummies.
We find that the one-year lag of RSPM is included in ratings by S&P in some cases, especially
RSPMCO2 and RSPMWaterU, showing that there are concerns about those issues. However,
the two-year lag of MC is not taken into account at all, which shows that the commitment
of companies to not worsen their performance is not given importance when credit ratings are
awarded to them.
Analysing the trend in this behaviour over time, we find that the tendency to value good
sustainability performance by increasing the creditworthiness of companies decreased between
2009 and 2015, while the commitment of companies on those issues is not taken into account in
any of the periods analysed.
Our sector by sector analysis shows that the RSPM included most in credit ratings is
RSPMCO2, which has a significantly positive effect on the credit ratings of companies in four
out of 10 sectors, including Energy and Basic Materials.
We also performed the analysis using Fitch ratings instead of S&P and found that for the
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subsample with observations for both Fitch and S&P ratings, the RSPMs are not significant
for either rating. This is something that will have to be tested further to see if there are really
differences between the two ratings or not.
Finally, we confirmed the findings of other authors concerning the importance of more tra-
ditional and popular scores such as those given by ASSET4 when determining credit ratings. It
is, however, worth mentioning that the calculation of those specific scores had been discontinued
in 2018 and that a new methodology to calculate ESG scores had been proposed by ASSET4 in
2017.
All in all, we can conclude that traditional sustainability measures are taken into account
by credit rating agencies more than novel quantitative sustainability performance measures and
that commitment measures are not considered at all in the credit rating process.
We think that credit rating agencies should consider including both measures to a greater
extent in the rating process in order to better reflect the creditworthiness of the companies.
Using them, credit rating agencies would be able to select the most important ESG factors for
each sector, not having to rely on agglutinative scores.
The increasing sustainability consciousness of investors could provoke the above-mentioned
change in the rating process, and that way, the risks associated with irresponsible sustainability
behaviours would be penalised. Moreover, taking the sustainability performance and commit-
ment of companies into account when establishing credit ratings could foster improvements in
corporate governance (Bereskin et al., 2015), as well as environmental and social improvements.
Interestingly, Aktas et al. (2018) stated that companies that have lost their investment grade
rating engage more in CSR afterwards. Similarly, Chiang et al. (2017) find that companies ‘near
a broad bond rating change tend to reduce their irresponsible CSR activities more than firms
that are not near a broad bond rating change’. This implies that if credit rating agencies take
into consideration sustainability performance and commitment measures such as RSPM and
MC when determining the ratings, they could encourage companies to behave more sustainably,
thus themselves also contributing to a more sustainable future.
This would also imply that firm managers would have to put sustainability in a more centered
position within the company’s strategy in order to pursue more non-financial objectives, for
instance reducing their CO2 emissions. This would benefit them because they would get better
credit ratings and be more sustainable, both economically, environmentally and socially. More
importantly, society as a whole would also benefit from their strategic switch.
With this paper, we have filled some gaps in the literature, such as the use of other sus-
tainability measures and not only global, but also individual measures, as suggested by Menz
(2010). However, the results suffer from the limitation derived from the scarcity of non-financial
reporting. Therefore, it would be useful to repeat this study when more information about more
resources is published by companies and to customise the performance measures by including
the resources most relevant to each sector (or sub-sector if enough information is available).
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Conclusions
This thesis covers three different but closely related topics.
First, Chapter 1 analyses ESG reporting patterns for a broad international set of companies
over a 16 year period. The analysis is conducted for environmental, social and governance
disclosure separately and using previously calculated principal components. To perform that
analysis hybrid mixed-effects generalised linear panel data models with robust standard errors
clustered by company that include time fixed-effects are estimated. The main highlights of the
findings are the following:
1. Reporting patterns are different for environmental and social information and governance
information.
2. Companies in environmentally sensitive industries report more environmental and social
information, but neither more nor less governance information.
3. South Africa is the best performer overall, proving that it is possible to do well in all three
dimensions of ESG reporting, and Peru and Argentina are the worst performers.
4. The USA is one of the best performers in terms of governance reporting, but one of the
worst in terms of environmental and social information disclosure.
5. Being domiciled in the Euro area has a positive effect on environmental reporting but a
negative effect on governance reporting.
6. Companies domiciled in tax havens also tend to report more environmental information
and less governance information.
7. Mandatory general sustainability disclosure regulations have a positive effect on all types
of reporting.
Second, Chapter 2 proposes two measures that process the ESG data disclosed by companies
into single figures that are easily understood:
• The Relative Sustainable Performance Measure (RSPM) measures non-financial perfor-
mance of companies with reference to their sector. It is positive if a company is performing
better than average for the sector and negative if it is performing worse.
• The Measure of Commitment-failure (MC) shows whether the trend in RSPM his down-
ward (and if so how much) over time. Its value is zero if a company has not worsened
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its performance over the period analysed and greater than zero if it has. The higher the
value, the more the company’s performance has worsened.
In the same study RSPM and MC are implemented for a sample of companies in the chemical
sector and the figures obtained are shown in the graphical 2D sustainability analysis, which makes
it easy to compare ESG performance because it resembles a mean-variance graph.
Finally, Chapter 3 analyses the influence of sustainability performance and commitment
measures on credit ratings. The analysis is conducted using fixed-effects ordered probit model
estimations with robust standard errors clustered by company that include economic sector and
year dummies. The main findings of this study are:
1. Sustainability performance measures matter in the credit rating process.
2. More novel measures are taken into account less than traditional sustainability performance
measures.
3. The influence of sustainability performance is especially relevant for some sectors, such
as energy and basic materials, which is consistent with the results obtained in Chapter
1. These are the two sectors that report most ESG data, which, in turn, makes it easier
for rating agencies to take their sustainability performance into account when determining
credit ratings.
4. Commitment measures are not taken into consideration at all by credit rating agencies.
All in all, this thesis fills some gaps in the literature but the findings also raise new questions,
especially those in Chapters 1 and 3. For example, related to Chapter 1, further research should
be done analysing the effect of regulations on non-financial reporting in more depth, taking
into account the number of ESG items that firms must report. Comparative case studies would
be interesting to extend knowledge of how to increase ESG reporting by following the best-in-
class. Finally, to improve the study conducted in Chapter 3, performance measures considered
as possible determinants of credit ratings could be customised by including the resources most
relevant to each sector.
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